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ABSTRACT 
Recent events, such as the Heparin tragedy, highlight the necessity for 
designers and planners of supply chain networks to consider the risk of disruptions in 
spite of their low probability of occurrence. One effective way to hedge against 
supply chain network disruptions is to have a robustly designed supply chain network. 
This involves strategic decisions, such as choosing which markets to serve, which 
suppliers to source from, the location of plants, the types of facilities to use, and 
tactical decisions, such as production and capacity allocation. In this dissertation, we 
focus on models for designing supply chain networks that are resilient to disruptions.  
We consider two types of decision making policies. A risk-neutral decision 
making policy is based on the cost minimization approach, and the decision-maker 
defines the set of decisions that minimize expected cost. We also consider a risk-
averse policy wherein rather than selecting facilities that minimize expected cost, the 
decision-maker uses a Conditional Value-at-Risk approach to measure and quantify 
risk. However, such network design problems belong to class of NP hard problems. 
Accordingly, we develop efficient heuristic algorithms and metaheuristic approaches 
to obtain acceptable solutions to these types of problems in reasonable runtimes so 
that the decision making process is facilitated with at most a moderate reduction in 
solution quality. Finally, we perform statistical analyses (e.g., logistic regression) to 
assess the likelihood of selection for each facility. These models allow us to identify 
the factors that impact facility selection in both the risk-neutral and risk-averse 
policies. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Motivation 
Over the last several decades, considerable effort has been expended in order 
to make supply chains leaner. Recent studies indicate that, while this effort has 
effectively reduced operational costs, it has also increased the vulnerability of supply 
chains to disruption risks [1,2]. Disruptions in supply chains can be defined as 
“unplanned and unanticipated events that disrupt the normal flow of goods and 
materials within a supply chain [3].” As an example, in 1999, an earthquake in 
Taiwan had a dramatic impact on the global semiconductor market. This caused a 
temporary global shortage of semiconductor components with production down times 
that ranged from two to four weeks [4]. This disruption resulted in significant physical 
costs (e.g., damage to facilities, inventory, electronic networks, and infrastructure) as 
well as lost revenue due to decreased sales and production, and missed deliveries.   
Some supply chain disruptions are not only costly, but may have catastrophic 
consequences in spite of their low probability of occurrence. For instance, in the 
healthcare supply chain, it is not acceptable to experience a late delivery or product 
shortage if patients’ lives are in danger.  Nevertheless, several examples of disruptions 
in healthcare supply chains exist. For example, the disruption of a flu vaccine 
manufacturer in Bristol, U.K. in 2004 resulted in disastrous consequences. The U.K. 
government stopped production when U.S. regulators inspected a manufacturing plant 
and found evidence of bacterial contamination problems. This reduced the U.S.’s 
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supply of the vaccine by nearly 50% during the 2004-2005 flu season [5]. While 
many may feel influenza is a minor disease, influenza causes 250,000 to 500,000 
deaths per year and is the sixth most common cause of death in the U.S. when 
combined with pneumonia [6]. Pharmaceutical and healthcare supply chains are also 
susceptible to disruptions caused by contamination. Heparin, a widely-used blood-
thinning medicine that is made from pig intestines, was contaminated by an 
undetected outbreak of blue ear pig disease in China in 2008. This contamination led 
to 81 patient deaths and to hundreds of allergic reactions in the US [7]. The 
investigation of the event involved several government agencies, university 
researchers, and a biotech company that had a generic heparin under FDA review. 
Although no one at the time knew what was causing the reactions, members of 
Congress concluded that the issue was the result of “regulatory failure” [7]. In another 
supply chain disruption, a baby food producer who purchased vitamin supplements 
from a Chinese supplier found out that the supplements were contaminated by cement 
[8]. This incident involved twenty-two Chinese and ten global manufacturers and led 
to kidney problems and kidney stones in Chinese babies and illustrates the result of 
poor or failed inspection by FDA or production facilities [9]. A 2008 US Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report indicated that in 2007, the FDA inspected 
approximately 8% of foreign facilities and declared that, at that rate, it would take 13 
years to inspect all such facilities [10]. On the other hand, inspection of raw materials 
is usually a substantial portion of manufacturing costs and manufacturing facilities 
search for cost-reduction opportunities [11]. As a result, while consumers may assume 
all goods are inspected, some goods are either not inspected or are inadequately 
inspected. 
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All of these examples with the exception of the influenza example could have 
been detected by inspecting the upstream suppliers’ (suppliers of raw materials) 
and/or producers’ production line and manufacturing plants; however, the case of 
influenza vaccine was undetectable and was only a consequence of facilities’ failure.  
These types of incidents and the reality that not all goods entering the 
pharmaceutical supply chain can be inspected by the FDA or other equivalent 
regulatory agencies accentuate the need to consider supply chain risks and (supply) 
disruptions in the design and planning stages. However, managers typically tend to 
underestimate the impact of supply chain disruptions, deceived by their small 
probability of occurrence, and design supply chain networks to minimize the 
operational cost without considering any disruption scenarios. Unfortunately, once a 
disruption occurs, there are few opportunities to change existing supply chain 
infrastructure. Therefore, to hedge against supply chain disruptions, it is critical to 
consider potential disruptions during the design of the supply chain networks so that 
the supply chain can perform acceptably in the event of an unplanned disruption.  
The risk-neutral policy may arise due to forces of globalization, which 
encourage firms to aggressively design their supply network base around the world in 
order to find opportunities for reducing supply chain costs. However, emphasizing 
supply chain costs may make that chain fragile and more susceptible to the risk of 
disruption.  
This research focuses on risks that impact strategic and tactical decisions. We 
discuss models for designing supply chain networks that are resilient to disruptions. 
We focus on tainted materials, inspired by the contamination cases described above. 
We reduce (but do not completely eliminate) tainted materials by introducing 
4 
 
producer-implemented inspections. In all cases, we assume that some tainted and 
untainted materials are shipped and model the risk of shipping tainted materials with a 
penalty cost; when we inspect facilities; we also incur costs related to inspection and 
the disposal of discovered tainted materials.  
 The objective is to design the supply chain infrastructure under the risk of 
disruption, so that it operates with highest possible efficiency (i.e., at low cost) both 
normally and when a disruption occurs.  
Supply network design problems are usually modeled as a 0–1 mixed integer 
programming problem and many have been shown to be NP-hard [12],[13]. While 
substantial efforts have been devoted to develop exact methods for this type of 
problem (see, e.g., [14,15]), (meta) heuristics must be resorted to when dealing with 
large sized instances. Accordingly, in this dissertation, we develop efficient heuristic 
algorithms and various metaheuristics approaches to obtain acceptable solutions to 
these types of problems in reasonable runtimes.   
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1.2. Main Contribution 
In this dissertation, three models will be considered to address the problem 
described above. The techniques utilized in our study encompass mathematical 
models, computational algorithm design and solution procedures, and statistical 
analysis. 
The first model considers a single-period, single-product supply chain with 
capacitated facilities, modeled as a two-stage mixed integer stochastic program to 
minimize the expected cost. The first-stage decisions represent the strategic decisions 
of facility selection. In the second-stage, tactical decisions, namely inspection policy 
and capacity allocation, are considered in response to disruptions at facility sites.  
The consideration of facility inspection is a key parameter in our model. 
Tragedies, such as the Heparin and Chinese baby food manufacturing incidents, 
inspired this aspect of the work. If the risk of shipping tainted materials can be 
minimized prior to such tragedies, producers can decrease liability and improve 
consumer safety. Designers of several types of supply chains, such as healthcare, 
pharmaceutical, cosmetic and beauty, and food and dairy products should be 
interested in the network design insights provided by our model related to reducing 
the risk of tainted products reaching consumers.  
To deal with uncertainty, a scenario-based model is proposed. Researchers 
have used this type of model to deal with uncertainties of supply or demand. The 
decision-maker identifies the set of potential scenarios and estimates the likelihood of 
each scenario occurring. Increasing the number of consumers, facilities and 
consequently, the number of scenarios to describe the underlying distributions 
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provides a better description of the actual problem, but it also increases the size of the 
problem. Experience from solving similar problems using commercial software in this 
research shows that the number of scenarios used has a significant impact on the 
solution time. Our contribution is the development of several heuristics and 
metaheuristics to solve the complicated models presented in our work effectively and 
to obtain acceptable solutions to the models in a reasonable time, demonstrated 
through extensive computational tests.  
In the second model, we consider a risk-averse policy wherein rather than 
selecting facilities that minimize the expected cost; the decision-maker uses a method 
from financial engineering – Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) – to measure and 
quantify risk and to define what qualifies as a worst-case scenario. This methodology 
allows the user to specify the extent to which these worst-case scenarios should be 
avoided. The CVaR approach also allows a decision-maker to control the amount of 
supply to procure based on a desired risk level to avoid the worst-case operational 
scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, no authors have addressed the problem of the 
CVaR and facility/supplier selection concurrently. Our contribution here is two-fold. 
First, we will develop various heuristic and metaheuristic methods to solve the 
resultant large models. Second, we will provide valuable managerial insights by 
comparing the results of the CVaR model with the results of the cost minimization 
model.  
Finally, we will perform a statistical analysis to consider a logistic regression 
and multinomial logistic regression models to identify the factors that impact our 
strategic decisions in both the CVaR and cost minimization models.  To the best of 
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our knowledge, the problem we address and this type of analysis have not been 
tackled previously in the academic literature.  
1.3. Significance of the Dissertation   
The outcome of our models and the statistical analyses will enable managers 
to select the most appropriate suppliers for their pharmaceutical supply chain and to 
make capacity allocation and inspection implementation decisions under both risk-
neutral and risk-averse policies. The proposed models also determine when and where 
inspections and monitoring should be performed to reduce the risk of tainted material 
reaching consumers. This study will aid practitioners designing supply chains and 
policy makers devising various disruption mitigation strategies related to the costs and 
risks in supply chain. The significance of this research is summarized as following:  
 Our goal will be to solve the above-stated problem using heuristics or 
metaheuristics to effectively solve large sized problems.  
 The objective of most of the papers we reviewed is to minimize the cost when 
supply is random. However, our approach will be to use CVaR and to define 
what qualifies as a worst-case scenario. Instead of selecting facilities and 
allocating production across them to minimize expected costs, the CVaR 
approach allows a decision-maker to select the facilities and control the 
amount of supply based on avoidance of the worst-case scenario.  
 In this research, we perform logistic and multinomial logistic regression 
statistical analysis to identify the factors that impact our strategic decisions in 
both the CVaR and cost minimization models. To the best of our knowledge, 
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the problem we address and the regression model we use have not been 
previously used in this type of research. 
 This research will explore the trade-off between expected cost/profit and risk. 
The outcome of the model will allow managers and decision-makers to decide 
whether they should order from low cost, risky facilities or more reliable but 
more expensive facilities. 
1.4.  Structure of Dissertation    
The dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 presents an overview of the 
research issue, goal and objectives of the research.  
Chapter 2 reviews literature concerning supply network design under 
disruptions, risk minimization in supply chain network design, and finally, multi-
objective approaches in supply chain network design problems. 
Chapter 3 considers the modeling approach and the solutions procedures that 
can be applied to Model 1.  
Chapter 4 presents CVaR to minimize risk, resulting in Model 2. Heuristic and 
metaheuristic approaches are developed to solve Model 2. 
Chapter 5 presents the logistic regression model and the multinomial logistic 
regression model, which are then used to identify the factors that impact strategic 
decisions in both the CVaR and cost minimization models.  This dissertation is 
concluded in Chapter 6 with a discussion of future research directions.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. Literature Review 
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the current literature state on 
the following research streams: 
 Supply chain design under risk and uncertainty 
 Risk minimization in supply chain network design  
2.1. Supply chain design under risk and uncertainty 
2.1.1. Introduction  
In the literature, supply chain disruptions can be classified as either small-
scale random disruptions or large-scale major disruptions. Small-scale random 
disruptions are those that are often caused by the usual random variations in, for 
example, consumer demand or delivery lead time. This category has received a fairly 
large amount of attention in the literature. Normally, the effects of such disruptions 
can be reduced by standard approaches such as maintaining increased safety stock 
inventories [16]. The concentration of this research is on large-scale disruptions which 
have received less attention in the literature. These kinds of disruptions tend to occur 
infrequently but have major effects on the operation of the supply chain. Recent 
events such as the Heparin tragedy, hurricane Katrina, the September 11 disaster, and 
the 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami belong to this category. Such events 
highlight the necessity for designers and planners to consider the risk of disruptions in 
supply chain networks. 
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The design decisions of a supply chain network are made on two levels: the 
strategic level and the tactical level. Strategic level design involves deciding the 
configuration of the network, i.e., the number, selection, location, and technology of 
the facilities. Tactical level design involves deciding the operation of the network, i.e., 
controlling material flows for purchasing, processing, distribution of products, etc. 
2.1.2. Related Literature 
Supply chain network design under the risk of disruption has recently received 
an increasing amount of attention from the research community. Table 2-1 
summarizes a number of the most recent research efforts in this area. In each column, 
we identify the author(s) (in alphabetical order), year, description of their research, 
each study's problem type (Problem Type: Deterministic or Stochastic), the source of 
uncertainty (Random Source: Supply or Demand), decision type (Strategic, Tactical), 
capacitated or uncapacitated, approach details, and if a metaheuristic approach is used 
or not.  
We note that the vast majority of the supply chain disruption literature focuses 
on demand uncertainty. In terms of the classification scheme in Table 2-1, our model 
is stochastic and focuses on the supply-side, the decision type is strategic and tactical, 
the capacity is limited (capacitated), the type of model is mixed integer stochastic 
programming, and the solution approach is heuristic and metaheuristic. The literature 
summary indicates that this has not been considered in the current body of literature. 
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Table 2-1 Literature review summary on supply chain design under uncertainty 
Author(s) Year 
Proble
m type 
Source of 
uncertainty 
Decision 
type 
Capacitated? Approach details Metaheuristic? 
Aghezzaf [17] 2004 S Demand Strategic Yes 
Robust 
optimization 
No 
Agrawal et al. [18] 2000 S Demand Tactical No 
Stochastic 
modeling 
No 
Altiparmak et al. 
[19] 
2006 D - Strategic Yes MIP Yes 
Applequist et al. 
[20] 
2000 S Demand Strategic No 
Stochastic 
modeling 
No 
Arora, Arora [21] 2010 D - 
Strategic, 
Tactical 
Yes MIP No 
Blanchini et al. [22] 1997 S Demand Tactical No 
Stochastic 
modeling 
No 
Caserta and Rico 
[23] 
2008 D - 
Strategic, 
Tactical 
Yes MIP Yes 
Cohen and Lee [24] 1988 S 
Demand, 
supply 
Tactical No 
Stochastic 
Programming 
No 
Cui et al. [25] 2010 S Supply 
Strategic, 
Tactical 
No 
Stochastic 
Modeling 
No 
Hoff et al. [26] 2007 S Demand Tactical No 
Stochastic 
Modeling 
Yes 
Jayaraman and Ross 
[27] 
2003 D - 
Strategic, 
Tactical 
Yes MIP Yes 
Kasilingam and Lee 
[28] 
1996 S Demand 
Strategic, 
Tactical 
No 
MIP- 
Commercial 
Software 
No 
Keshkin and Uster 
[29] 
2007 D - 
Strategic, 
Tactical 
Yes MIP Yes 
Lin [30] 2009 S Demand 
Strategic, 
Tactical 
Yes 
MIP/Lagrangean 
relaxation 
No 
Miranda and 
Garrido [31] 
2004 S Demand 
Strategic, 
Tactical 
No 
MIP/Lagrangean 
relaxation 
No 
Qi and Shen [32] 2007 S Supply 
Strategic, 
Tactical 
No 
MIP/stochastic 
programming 
No 
Qi et al.[33] 2010 S Supply 
Strategic, 
Tactical 
No 
MIP/stochastic 
programming 
No 
Shen et al. [34] 2008 S Supply 
Strategic, 
Tactical 
No 
MIP/stochastic 
programming 
No 
Xu and Nozick [35] 2009 S Supply 
Strategic, 
Tactical 
Yes 
MIP/Lagrangean 
relaxation 
No 
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2.2. Risk minimization in supply chain network design  
2.2.1. Introduction 
As noted earlier, some supply chain disruptions are not only costly, but may 
have catastrophic consequences in spite of their low probability of occurrence. For 
instance, we discussed the healthcare supply chain, where it is not acceptable to 
experience a late delivery or product shortage if patients’ lives are in danger.  Hence, 
catastrophic healthcare delivery problems must be avoided earnestly. Nevertheless, to 
the best of our knowledge, the objective of the majority of the papers reviewed is 
based on a cost minimization approach and the decision-makers are risk-neutral. That 
might arise due to globalization where firms are aggressively designing their supply 
network base around the world to find opportunities for reducing supply chain costs. 
However, emphasizing supply chain cost might make the supply chain fragile and 
more susceptible to the risk of disruptions.  
Our plan is to manage the cost associated with the risk of supply disruptions. 
Therefore, we consider a risk-averse policy where the decision-maker, rather than 
selecting facilities and identifying the assignment base set that minimizes expected 
cost, uses a Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) approach to measure and quantify the 
risk and also define what qualifies as a worst-case scenario. This methodology allows 
the user to specify to what extent these worst-case scenarios should be avoided. In the 
next section, we discuss the articles on risk management in supply chain network 
design.   
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2.2.2. Related Literature 
A small body of literature has addressed the risk-averse approach to decision-
making in the supply chain network design. With the objective of either minimizing 
the expected opportunity loss or minimizing the maximum opportunity loss, Current 
et al. [36] studied problems in which the total number of facilities to be located is 
uncertain over a planning horizon. Gaonkar and Vsiwanadham [37] developed a 
model for selecting suppliers to minimize the expected shortfall under disruption. The 
general idea was to match demand and supply using cost as the single criterion. Other 
researchers also developed risk-based analytical approaches to supplier selection and 
evaluation [38-40]).  
Researchers have also applied the concept of mean-variance optimization (see 
[41]) in the supply chain network design problem [42-48]. The general idea was that 
the firms consider both costs and risks in their model by using a mean-variance 
approach to minimize the expected total cost and valuation of the risk. The objective 
function is of the form    Z E s Var s  where s  denotes the random payoff and 
 is a measure of risk aversion [47]. However, several limitations are associated with 
this mean-variance formulation. For instance, the estimate of risk by mean-variance is 
only suitable when returns are normally distributed (see Pardalos et al. [49]). 
Other researchers have used Value at Risk (VaR) to make strategic/tactical 
decisions in the supply chain network design [50-54]. VaR is a risk measure that 
mostly focuses on rare events and provides the value that can be expected to be lost 
during severe, adverse market fluctuations [55]. However, there are some problems 
associated with VaR, which will be discussed in Section 4.2. Therefore, these issues 
led some researchers to use an alternative measure CVaR, in a few areas such as 
14 
 
portfolio optimization [56], transportation and fleet allocation [57], market/demand 
selection problem [58], electricity procurement problem [59], and facility location 
problem (see [60]). By utilizing the CVaR concept, Chen et al. [61] addressed an 
uncapacitated stochastic p-median problem in which the objective was to minimize 
the expected regret associated with a subset of worst-case scenarios whose collective 
probability of occurrence is not more than 1- . In their model, the demand and the 
distance between the demand nodes and the facilities were stochastic.   
Table 2-2 Literature review summary on risk minimization in supply chain network design 
2.3. Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the literature that pertains to the modeling of the 
effects of disruptions on supply chain operations. We initially considered the literature 
that pertains to the supply chain design under risk and uncertainty in Section 2.1. The 
literature summary indicates the research goal and some modeling assumptions have 
not been addressed in the current body of literature. Next we also employ a risk-
averse approach in Chapter 4, as discussed in Section 2.2. The material in this chapter 
contributes important understanding of supply chain risk management particularly, 
within the context of the pharmaceutical supply chain. 
 Author(s) Year 
Problem 
type 
Source of 
uncertainty 
Decision 
type 
Risk 
measure 
Approach details Metaheuristic? 
1 Chen et al. [61] 2006 D - Strategic α-reliable MIP No 
2 Noyan [62] 2011 S Demand 
Strategic, 
Tactical 
CVaR 
MIP/Decompositi
on Method 
No 
3 Ravindaran [39] 2010 S Demand 
Strategic, 
Tactical 
VaR 
Stochastic 
modeling 
No 
4 
Sawik [63] 
 
2010 S Supply 
Strategic, 
Tactical 
CVaR MIP No 
5 Shen et al. [64] 2008 S Demand Strategic CVaR 
Stochastic 
modeling 
No 
6 
Wagner et al. 
[53] 
2009 S Demand Strategic VaR 
Stochastic 
modeling 
No 
15 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
3. Supply Chain Network Design in the Presence of Disruption Risk: A 
Metaheuristic Approach 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we consider a single-period, single-product supply chain with 
capacitated facilities, which is modeled as a two-stage stochastic 0-1 problem.  The 
goal of the model consists of selecting facilities in the first-stage, and defining 
capacity (product) allocation among the consumers and the inspection policy in the 
second stage. The objective is to minimize the expected cost composed of the fixed 
cost of selecting facilities, the cost of shipping untainted products, the cost of shipping 
tainted products, the cost of inspecting facilities, and the cost of discarding tainted 
products.  
While mixed integer stochastic programming models for this problem may 
allow for an exact solution in some situations, it can be very challenging to draw 
concrete analytical insights from such models and to obtain good solutions for large 
instances within a limited time frame since the problems are NP-hard [13]. As a 
result, we develop several heuristics and metaheuristics to efficiently solve and handle 
large sized problems. Finally, some experimental results are reported to obtain more 
insight from the model. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 the 
problem description is discussed. The mathematical formulation is introduced in 
Section 3.3. In Sections 3.4 and 3.5, the data generation method and solution 
procedure are presented, respectively. Computational results are discussed in Section 
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3.6. Finally, conclusions and recommendations for future research comprise Section 
3.8. 
3.2. Problem Description 
The earliest work in supply chain network design was developed by Geoffrion 
and Graves [65]. They introduced a multi-commodity logistics network design model 
for optimizing finished product flows from plants to distribution centers to final 
consumers. Beginning with the work of Geoffrion and Graves, a large number of 
optimization-based approaches have been proposed for the design of supply chain 
networks. These works have resulted in significant improvements in the modeling of 
these problems as well as in algorithmic and computational efficiency. However, 
generally this research assumes that the design parameters for the supply chain are 
deterministic [23,66-70]. Unfortunately, critical parameters such as the consumers’ 
demand, resource supply, and the price of the material are generally uncertain.  
Therefore, traditional deterministic optimization is not suitable for truly capturing the 
behavior of the real-world problem.   
The significance of uncertainty has encouraged a number of researchers to 
address stochastic parameters in their research. However, most of the stochastic 
approaches for supply chain network design only consider tactical level decisions 
usually related to demand uncertainty [26,71-73], while supply uncertainty is often 
ignored and supply capacity assumed to be unlimited (see [74] for more details). For 
instance, Santoso et al. [75] proposed a stochastic programming approach for 
addressing demand uncertainty in supply chain network design. Alonso-Ayuso et al. 
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[54] developed a two-stage stochastic model for strategic production planning under 
demand uncertainty. Tsiakis et al. [76] and Alonso-Ayuso et al. [72] also considered a 
two-stage stochastic programming model for supply chain network design under 
demand uncertainty.  
In contrast with most prior research, we focus on the supply (capacity) 
management required to mitigate the impact of facility capacity disruptions. 
Moreover, we assume that supply quantities can be influenced by inspection, which 
might be conducted at facility locations. The decision to inspect products before they 
are shipped is made in some cases (e.g., by the FDA in pharmaceutical and food 
supply chains). 
We consider a mixed integer stochastic programming model that is formulated 
as a two-stage optimization problem. We consider the selection of the facilities as the 
first-stage variables, which is modeled as either selected or unselected. The binary 
character of the strategic decision variables is one of the most fundamental 
characteristics of the first-stage problem. The second-stage decision variables include 
tactical decisions which are made after the realization of the random events (supply 
disruption) is known. The second-stage decisions indicate the production/capacity 
allocation policies as well as the decision to inspect each facility. Therefore, this stage 
is referred to as a product allocation problem in which cost is minimized by allocating 
the capacity and determining whether or not inspection should be implemented in 
each selected facility. The inspection decision is modeled as a binary variable for each 
facility. Therefore, the model enables us to determine when and where inspections 
should be performed with the intent of minimizing the amount of tainted products 
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shipped to consumers by utilizing appropriate penalty costs. Insights on how networks 
should be configured to avoid the risk of tainted products reaching consumers are of 
interest to several types of supply chains such as healthcare, pharmaceutical, cosmetic 
and beauty, food or automotive industries. Consequences and real-world examples of 
shipped tainted product are addressed in Section 1.1.  
In Figure 3-1, we provide a hypothetical supply network with an initial 
assignment of consumers to facilities at a point in time before any disruptions have 
occurred. We consider a set of facilities and consumers. In some cases disruptions can 
be a consequence of tainted raw material (received from suppliers). Hence, for the 
sake of clarity and in order to show the flow of raw materials from the suppliers to the 
facility, we have illustrated the set of suppliers as well. Three facilities were selected 
and the capacity was sufficient to fulfill all the demand of all the consumers. 
 
Figure 3-1 Initial demand allocation (before disruption) 
The scenario where a disruption occurred at two of the facilities is illustrated 
in Figure 3-2. We assume that the disruption was the consequence of a disruption in 
the suppliers of raw materials. This disruption caused the facilities to produce tainted 
items and ship them to consumers.  
 
(Selected)Facilities Consumers 
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Figure 3-2  Shipping tainted products to consumers after disruptions (no inspection) 
Once inspection is implemented in a facility, a portion of tainted items is 
discarded and fewer tainted items are delivered to the consumers. This idea is 
illustrated in Figure 3-3. However, discarding the tainted items might result in 
consumer demand being unsatisfied. Then, the unmet demand can be fulfilled by 
adding another facility as illustrated in Figure 3-3.   
 
Figure 3-3 Reduction of delivered tainted products (after inspection) 
 
 
 
  
Suppliers (Selected) Facilities Consumers 
Shipping tainted raw materials 
Tainted product potentially 
delivered to consumer 
Disruption at supplier/production 
facility 
Suppliers (Selected)Facilities Consumers 
 
Reduction in shipping tainted 
products (with inspection) 
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3.3. Mathematical Model (Cost Minimization Model) 
Consider a supply chain network  ,L C  where L   is the set of facilities 
and C  is the set of consumers. In the first stage, lx  is 1 if facility l  is selected and is 
0 otherwise (where l L  is an index for facilities). Let  ,Q x s  represent the optimal 
solution of the second-stage problem corresponding to the first-stage decision variable 
x  and the random scenario s . Thus, the stochastic formulation of the problem can be 
written as 
 min ,l l
l L
x f E Q x s

                                                                                               (1) 
Subject to  0,1 ,lx l L                                                                                      (2) 
where  ,E Q x s    
is the expected cost taken with respect to random scenario s . The 
objective (1) in the first-stage problem is the sum of the cost of selecting facilities. 
The first-stage constraint (2) restricts the decision variables  lx  to be binary. Given a 
feasible first-stage solution vector x , the objective of the second-stage problem for 
random scenario s minimizes the sum of the allocation (shipping) cost of the 
untainted products, the cost of shipping tainted product, the cost of discarding tainted 
product after inspection, and the cost of inspection. In this model, we discard tainted 
products. An alternative is to repair (or rework) the tainted product, an option which 
we may consider in future research. 
To deal with the uncertainty in the second stage, a scenario-based modeling 
approach is proposed that has been used in stochastic programing problems [13,72]. 
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In the second stage, let us consider random scenario s  with  Pr ss s    where s  
is the probability of occurrence for scenario s . Given a finite set of scenarios, with 
associated probabilities s ,  ,E Q x s   can be evaluated as 
   , , .Ss SE Q x s Q x s       
Hence, we can present the deterministic equivalent of 
the formulation (1). To simplify, we denote this as the Supply Chain Design (SCD) 
model. We first summarize the complete notation for the SCD as sets and parameters:  
Sets 
    C  the set of consumers, indexed by c 
    L  the set of candidate facilities, indexed by l 
    S  the set of realized scenarios, indexed by s 
 
Parameters 
    
lf  the fixed cost of opening facility l 
    
l  the capacity of facility l 
    
ln  
 the fixed cost of implementing an inspection at candidate facility l 
    
cb  the total demand of consumer c 
   lc
  the cost of shipping an untainted product from facility l to consumer c 
        
lc  the penalty cost for shipping a tainted product from facility l to 
consumer c 
   
lc  the cost of discarding a tainted product at facility l after inspection 
originally destined for consumer c 
   
s  the probability of occurrence for scenario s 
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lsq  the fraction of tainted products produced at facility l in scenario s 
        
lsr  the fraction of tainted products produced at facility l after inspection in 
scenario s (we assume 
ls lsq r ) 
To make the definitions of 
lsq  and lsr  clearer, suppose that, under scenario s, 
the extent of failures at the unreliable facility l is given by 0.20lsq  and 0.05lsr  . 
This means that for every 100 units of production at facility l, 100 20lsq  of them 
will be tainted. If no inspection is implemented, these 20 tainted units will be shipped 
to consumers. If inspection is implemented, 15 of these 20 tainted units will be 
detected and discarded while 100 5lsr   units will be undetected and shipped to 
consumers. 
Decision Variables 
  
1, if facility  is selected,
0, else
l
l
x

 

  
  
1, if inspection is used at facility ,
0, else
l
l
z

 
  
       
lcsp      the number of products shipped from facility l to consumer c in scenario s 
       
lcsk      the number of tainted products produced at facility l intended to be shipped    
to consumer c in scenario s 
   
lcsd     the number of tainted products produced at facility l intended to be shipped 
to consumer c but discarded after inspection in scenario s  
The deterministic equivalent of the formulation is proposed in [77]. However, 
for the convenience of the reader, we also present the formulation. Note that the 
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second-stage decision variables are indexed by a scenario index. The SCD model 
follows: 
   SCD min    1  s ls lcs lc lcs lc lcs l ls
l L c C l L c C l L c C l L
l l lc
l L s S
q p k d nx f z  
      
 
     

  

      
(3) 
 subject to ,1 ls lcs lcs lcs l l
c C
q p l L s Sk d x

                                   (4) 
, ,lcs lcs ls lcs c C lk L s Sd q p                       (5) 
( ) (1 , ,)lcs ls lcs lsk r p M z c C l L s S                       (6) 
( ) (1 , ,)lcs ls ls lcs lsd q r p M l s Sz c C L                        (7) 
) , ,(lcs ls c C l L sd M z S                      (8) 
 1 ,ls lcs lcs c
l L
p k b c C s Sq

                                (9)
 ,ls l l L Sz sx                             (10) 
      
, 0 , ,,lcs lcs lcs c L Sk C sp ld                      (11) 
       
 0,1 ,lsz l L s S                            (12)                    
 
 0,1 .lx l L                           (13) 
The objective function (3) in the first stage problem is the sum of fixed cost of 
selecting facilities. The second stage consists of four distinct terms. The first term 
 1 ls lcs
l c C
lc
L
q p
 
 
   
 

 
represents the expected transportation cost of shipping 
untainted products. The second term lc lcs
l L c C
k
 
 
 
 
  and the third term lc lcs
l L c C
d
 
 
 
 
  
represent the penalty cost of supplying tainted products for the consumers and the cost 
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of discarding tainted products, respectively. Finally, the last term l ls
l L
n z

 
 
 
  is the cost 
of inspection, which is implemented at a facility site.  
Constraint set (4) requires a facility to be open if any portion of the consumer 
demand is served from the facility. In addition, constraint set (4) ensures that the total 
consumer demand assigned to any facility does not exceed the facility's capacity. 
Constraint sets (5)-(8) together represent the amount of tainted product that is shipped 
to the consumer. Hence, without inspection, when 0lsz  , constraint set (8) implies 
that 0lcsd  . Given constraint set (5), all of the tainted products will reach the 
consumer. However if inspection is implemented, constraint sets (6) and (7) imply 
that only products passing inspection (which may include some tainted products) will 
be shipped to the consumer. Constraint set (9) requires that the demand of every 
consumer is met. Constraint set (10) implies that inspection is applied only to the 
selected set of facilities. Constraint set (11) requires that ,lcs lcsk d , and lcsp  are positive 
values. Finally, constraint sets (12) and (13) place binary restrictions on variables lsz  
and lx . 
3.4. Generation of Test Data 
We model a facility as either being in a pristine condition, producing up to the 
full capacity with no tainted goods, or as being in a condition of producing some 
tainted material. Let 0 indicate that a facility is capable of operating at full capacity 
with no tainted material produced and let 1 indicate that a facility is producing some 
tainted materials. Let  0.50,0.95l  be the probability of facility l being in State 0, 
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which we call the reliability of facility l, drawn from a continuous uniform 
distribution. Therefore, the assumption that all facilities have an identical probability 
of working or failing is relaxed [78]. If a facility is in State 1, the proportion of tainted 
product is randomly selected from a continuous uniform distribution in the range 
 0.10,0.30 . The proportion of tainted product that is detected after inspection is 
randomly drawn from a continuous uniform distribution in the range  0.01,0.09 . 
To determine the probability of scenario s   ,s we need to define a scenario. 
A scenario is defined as an event where a subset of facilities (say L ) are in State 0 
and where facilities in the set '\L L  are in State 1. Given the number of facilities L , 
the total number of scenarios in which at least one facility is in State 1 is given by 
1
2 1
L
L
i
L
i
 
  
 
 .  Including the scenario in which all facilities are in State 0, the total 
number of scenarios is 2
L
. Hence, the probability of realizing a scenario s S is 
defined as  
\
1s l l
l L l L L

  
    . We list other assumptions as follows: 
 The fixed cost of opening a facility is drawn from a discrete uniform 
distribution between $1,000,000 and $2,000,000.  
 The demand for each consumer is drawn from a discrete uniform 
distribution between 100 and 300 units.  
 The cost of inspection at each facility is drawn from a discrete uniform 
distribution between $50,000 and $100,000. 
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 The cost of shipping untainted products is drawn from a discrete uniform 
distribution between $100 and $1000. 
 The penalty cost of shipping tainted products is drawn from a discrete 
uniform distribution between $10,000 and $20,000. 
 The cost to discard products is equal to 25% of the penalty cost of shipping 
untainted products. 
 The fraction of tainted products produced at facility l is correlated with the 
probability of facility l being in State 0. Hence, more reliable facilities 
produce less tainted products.  
 The cost of selecting a facility is correlated with the capacity so that the 
highest capacity has the highest selecting cost. 
 The cost of inspection is correlated to the percentage of improvement, 
which is the difference between lq  and lr . 
 The total capacity is 35% higher than the total demand before 
implementing inspection and discarding tainted items. 
3.5. Solution Procedure 
3.5.1. Heuristic 
We present a few constructive (greedy) heuristics in this section. In 
constructive algorithms, we start from scratch (empty solution) and construct a 
solution by assigning values to one decision variable at a time, until a complete 
solution is generated [79]. Constructive algorithms are popular techniques as they are 
simple to design. Moreover, their complexity compared to other algorithms such as 
iterative algorithms is low. However, in most optimization problems, the performance 
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of constructive algorithms may be low as well. Therefore, we also develop 
improvement algorithms to improve the quality of the solution achieved by 
constructive algorithms. In our improvement algorithm, we start with a complete 
solution (i.e., a constructive algorithm solution) and transform it at each iteration 
using some search operators to hopefully find a better solution.  
In our solution procedure, we first determine the set of selected facilities, x . 
Given the set of selected facilities, we determine the values for inspection i.e., lsz . 
Having  lx and lsz  determined and fixed to their binary values, equation (3) reduces to 
a capacitated transportation problem, which is relatively easier to solve. We call this 
model SCD-Sub, and its formulation is stated as follows: 
    SCD-Sub min 1     s ls lcs lc lcs lc lcs
l
lc
L c Cs S
q p k d  
 
 
     
 
                       
Notice that lcsk and lcsd are auxiliary decision variables which depend solely on lcsp  
and lsz . However, given the fact that lsz is already determined and fixed, we can 
rewrite the SCD-Sub as follows: 
         SCD-Sub min    1 11  s ls lc ls ls lc ls ls lc ls ls ls lcs
l Cs S L c
lc q q z z qr z r p   
  
   
 
    
 
 
  (14) 
subject to         , , ,lcs lcs ls lcs c C lk sq Ld p S                   (15) 
( ) (1 ), , ,lcs ls lcs lsk r p M c C l L sz S                      (16) 
( ) (1 ,), ,lcs ls ls lcs lsd q r p M c C l L sz S                       (17) 
, , ,( )lcs ls c C l L sd M z S                   (18) 
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 1 , ,ls lcs lcs c
l L
c C sq p k b S

                                (19) 
, , 0, , ,lcs lcs lcs c C l L sk p Sd                      (20) 
where lsz  is the fixed and known value of lsz . We will refer to this as SCD-Sub 
herein.  
3.5.1.1. Constructive Heuristics 
Our constructive heuristics operate in three stages. In stage one we determine 
the set of selected facilities. In stage two we determine the inspection values, and 
finally in the last stage, we solve SCD-Sub in two phases. In the following, all three 
stages are presented. 
Stage one methods 
We develop three constructive heuristics to determine the set of selected 
facilities as follows: 
 Basic Greedy Heuristic (BGH): One way to determine vector x  is to simply 
open all the facilities. Therefore, we have 1,lx l L   .  
 Selective Greedy Heuristic (SGH): In this method, we first start with an empty 
set for selected facilities. Steps are illustrated in Figure 3-4. We estimate the 
total costs of selecting a facility includes the fixed cost, and mean costs of 
shipping untainted products, shipping tainted products, and discarding tainted 
products and then we select the facilities with the minimum cost estimated 
total costs. 
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Figure 3-4 Pseudocode of the Selective Greedy Heuristic (SGH) 
 Capacity-Based Greedy Heuristic (CBGH): In this method, we first start with 
an empty set for selected facilities.  Then we choose a facility from the set of 
remaining candidates that reduces the total demand of the consumer the most. 
The corresponding steps are illustrated in Figure 3-5. 
 
for  
1. Calculate the expected available capacity of a facility. Assume that a facility operates 
with  full capacity with probability   and let 
 
denote the random variable for the 
available capacity where and . Therefore, 
the expected available capacity of facility l can be defined as
. For the sake of simplicity, we consider in our 
computations.  
2. Evaluate the total cost of selecting a facility. The estimated total costs of selecting a 
facility includes the fixed cost, and mean costs of shipping untainted products, shipping 
tainted products, and discarding tainted products. These costs are computed as , 
, and , respectively.  
3. Sort the calculated values in an increasing order, obtain the sequence of the facilities, 
and locate them in the set . Let be the corresponding expected available capacity 
of facility in set . 
4.  . 
5. Choose the cheapest facility from the set .  
6. if , go to 7, else  and go to 5. 
end for  
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Figure 3-5 Pseudocode of the Capacity-Based Greedy Heuristic (CBGH) 
Stage two methods 
Once the selected facilities have been set, we determine the inspection values 
for each scenario. We develop the following construction heuristics:  
 Failed Scenario Inspection Heuristic (FSIH): Consider ,lS l L   as the set of 
scenarios where facility l works with full capacity  and ,lS l L    as the set of 
scenarios where facility l will produce tainted products where l lS S S   . We 
define lsz as follows:  
1, 1, ,
0, 0, ,
l l
ls
l l
s S x l L s S
z
s S x l L s S
      
 
      
  
This heuristic performs inspection for only those facilities that are selected in stage 
one and belong to set of scenarios where facility l produces tainted products.  
 Greedy Inspection Heuristic (GIH): In this method, we define a desired 
shipping untainted level   0,1  , where  100% of the shipping 
products to consumers must be untainted. Let’s start with an empty set for z. 
for  
1. Calculate the expected available capacity as presented in step 1 of SGH. 
2. Sort the calculated values in step 1 in a decreasing order, obtain the sequence of 
the facilities, and locate them in the set . Let be the corresponding 
expected available capacity of facility in set . 
3. Choose the  facility from the set until satisfying .  
end for 
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Given a scenario s where ls S , the following relation should be satisfied
   1 1 cls l l ls ls l l ls
l L c C
q x z r x z b 
 
       . Otherwise, we perform 
inspection until we reach the desired level of untainted products  Note that we 
consider facilities in decreasing order of maximum reduction in the fraction 
tainted products or   max |l lq r l L   . We consider   0.90 in our 
computations. 
 Random Greedy Inspection Heuristic (RGIH): The basic idea of this method is 
to estimate how much we can save by implementing inspection in a facility. If 
this saving is substantial enough, then the inspection for a facility will be 
implemented. The steps are defined in Figure 3-6. 
 
Figure 3-6 Pseudocode of the Random Greedy Inspection Heuristic (RGIH) 
 
 
for  
1. Determine the amount of saving: calculate the saving for each facility by following 
equation. , where is the amount of saving for facility l 
in scenario s. Let the vector be the set of calculated savings where .  
2. Normalize vector : . 
3. Generate a set of random numbers, , where . 
4. Compare each element of vector with the corresponding element of vector .    If that 
is greater than the corresponding normalized saving value, then , and 1 otherwise. 
end for 
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Stage three methods 
In this stage we solve SCD-Sub in two phases. In the first phase, we set lcsp  in 
a greedy fashion, based on the unit transportation cost to the consumers ( lc ) and 
capacity of the selected facilities. Note that in Figure 3-7, ca represents the demand of 
consumer  , and lg  represents the capacity for facility l. In the second phase, given 
the obtained value for lcsp , we simply compute the values of auxiliary variables lcsk  
and lcsd . 
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Figure 3-7 Pseudocode to solve SCD-Sub 
Input:  set of consumers,   set of facilities,  set of scenarios, , , , 
, , ,  ,  and .  
Output:  and the total cost. 
Stage One:  Determine    
1. Use BGH, SGH or CBGH.  
Stage Two: Determine   
2. Use FSIH, GIH, or RGIH. 
Stage Three: Solve SCD-Sub 
Phase 1 
3.  
4. Sort in increasing order. ; . 
5.       
6.                 while  do 
7.                             
8.                                  if  then  
9.                                       
10.                                  else if then  
11.                                            
12.                                  end if 
13.                  end while 
14.         end for 
15. end for 
Phase 2 
16.  
17.       if  then 
18.            
19.
                      
 
20.
                      
 
21.              end for 
22.       else if then 
23.            
24.
                      
 
25.
                      
 
26.              end for 
27.       end if 
28. end for 
29. end 
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3.5.1.2. Improvement Heuristic 
In this section we develop improvement heuristics to improve the solution 
obtained from one of the heuristic methods presented above (note that improvement 
heuristics operate on a solution found by a constructive heuristic). First, we present a 
heuristic that begins with a feasible solution and seeks improvement to the original. 
The improvement heuristic iteratively closes one facility if the facility is already 
selected and opens a facility if a facility is not selected. This iteration enables us to 
generate a new neighborhood and explore if the new set of selected facilities provides 
a cheaper solution or not. In order to maintain feasibility, only moves are allowed 
which provide enough capacity to satisfy the total demand of the consumers. The 
details of this heuristic are shown in Figure 3-8.  
Figure 3-8 Pseudocode of the local_   
In the second improvement algorithm, we apply a Variable Neighborhood 
Search (VNS). The basic idea of VNS is to find a set of predefined neighborhoods to 
achieve a better solution. This algorithm is used to explore either at random or 
deterministically a set of neighborhoods to get different local optima and to escape 
from local optima (for general pseudocode of VNS see [80]). The purpose of the 
second improvement is to minimize transportation cost for each individual scenario, 
i.e., minimize   1lc ls lcs
l L c C
q p
 
   (21).  
1. for each facility  , if then otherwise if  then . Let be 
the new set of selected facilities . 
2. Compute saving as: 
 
3. If 
 
then . Go to 1. 
4. end for 
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Figure 3-9 Pseudocode of VNS algorithm adapted from [80] 
We implement the VNS for our problem as illustrated in Figure 3-10. 
Figure 3-10 VNS for improving the transportation cost 
The neighborhood strategy that we apply is structured by randomly choosing a 
point in the matrix of transportation. Subsequently, we identify the closed path 
leading to that point which consists of horizontal and vertical lines as illustrated. In 
order to generate a new solution, we move Rˆ  unit(s) from the chosen point and 
another point at a corner of the closed path and modify the remaining points at the 
other corners of the closed path to reflect this move. Note that Rˆ  is a random variable 
VNS Algorithm 
 
1. Initialization: Select the set of neighborhood structures 𝑁𝑘, for 𝑘 = 1, …, 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥, that 
will be used in the search; find an initial solution 𝑣; choose a stopping condition; 
2. Repeat the following steps until the stopping condition is met: 
a. Set 𝑘 ← 1; 
b. Repeat the following steps until 𝑘  𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥: 
i. Shaking: Generate a point at random from the neighborhood of  
𝑣 ( ). 
ii. Improve or not: If 𝑣’  is better than x, do v ← v’ and continue the search 
with 𝑁1(𝑘 ← 1); otherwise, set 𝑘 ← 𝑘 + 1 
 
1. Set  
2. for all  
3. while  
Shaking:  
a. Set  
b. Define a neighborhood strategy in u 
c. Apply a mechanism  to generate a new solution for u 
Improve or not:  
7. Calculate the cost for 𝑢 from equation (21).  
8. If  then else  
9. end while 
10. end for 
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over the range of zero and the minimum value of the four selected points. This 
scheme is demonstrated in Figure 3-11. The selected point is shown by  . 
   Consumer 
facility 
1 2 3 4 
1 50 60 + 85 85 ˗ 
2 21 45 29 29 
3 81 36* ˗  73 73    + 
4 62 78 91 20 
Figure 3-11 Neighborhood strategy in VNS 
3.5.2. Simulated Annealing 
Simulated Annealing is a metaheuristic approach inspired by nature. In this 
case, the process of a heated metal being cooled at a controlled rate (annealed) to 
improve its physical properties is simulated. The method was popularized by the work 
of Kirkpatrick et al. [81] which continued the earlier work of Metropolis et al. [82]. 
The fundamental idea is to allow moves resulting in solutions of worse quality than 
the current solution in order to escape from local optima [79]. The probability of 
doing such a move is decreased during the search.  
An important consideration in SA is to set the initial value of the 
temperature   . If the initial temperature is set very high, the search may be relatively 
close to a random local search. Otherwise, if the initial temperature is very low, the 
search might be an improving local search algorithm [79]. The choice of a suitable 
cooling schedule is also crucial for the performance of the algorithm. The cooling 
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schedule defines the value of temperature   at every iteration. The pseudo code of the 
simulated annealing algorithm is illustrated Figure 3-12. 
3.5.2.1. Defining Initial Temperature and Cooling Schedule 
The temperature T is decreased during the search process, thus at the 
beginning of the search the probability of accepting uphill moves is high and it 
gradually decreases. As stated, the choice of an appropriate cooling schedule and 
initial value of temperature are crucial for the performance of the algorithm. The 
cooling schedule defines the value of T  at each iteration  ,  1 ,k kT R T k  , where 
 ,kR T k is a function of the temperature at the previous step and of the iteration 
number. In this research, we use one of the most common cooling schedule which 
follows a geometric law as 1k kT T  , where  0,1  , which corresponds to an 
exponential decay of the temperature [83]. Furthermore, experience has shown that 
should be between 0.5 and 0.99 (see [79]). Hence, we considered four values,    
0.95, 0.90, 0.80 and 0.75; and we obtained the best minimum regret in less 
computational time at   0.75 (see Section 3.6.1 for more detail). 
Another important factor in SA is to define the initial value of the temperature 
0 T  properly. There is a tradeoff between a very high initial temperature and a lower 
one. The high temperature explores more of the solution space at the cost of increased 
running time. For this research, we use acceptance deviation methods proposed by 
Huang et al. [84]. The starting temperature is computed by t using preliminary 
experimentations on each data set, where   represents the standard deviation of 
difference between values of objective functions and 
 
3
ln
t

 with the acceptance 
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probability of  , which is greater than 3σ . Finally, a sufficient number of iterations 
at each temperature should be performed. If too few iterations are performed at each 
temperature, the algorithm may not be able to reach the global optimum.  Given the 
presented formula and after several experiments, we set the value for the initial 
temperature, 
0 T 8000. 
 
Figure 3-12 General scheme of Simulated Annealing (SA) (cf. Yang, [85]). 
3.5.2.2. Neighborhood Selection 
The manner in which a metaheuristic technique moves from one solution to its 
neighbor is a critical component. In our SA algorithm, we define a neighborhood 
which combines four neighborhood structures: (1) swapping one randomly selected 
facility with another randomly selected facility (SA-swap), (2) selecting one more 
facility (SA-add), (3) closing one selected facility (SA-remove), and finally (4) 
closing two facilities while selecting another two (SA-2swap . Note that we apply the 
same neighborhood strategy to determine the inspection values and afterward 
begin 
Objective function 𝑓 Ω ,Ω   Ω1,…,Ω𝑝  
Generate an initial solution Ω    and select an initial temperature𝑇 , 
𝑇 ← 𝑇  
Set final temperature 𝑇𝑓 and max number of iterations 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥 
Define cooling schedule 𝑇 ← 𝜃𝑇,𝜃 ∈   ,1  
while ( 𝑇 > 𝑇𝑓  and 𝑛 < 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥)  
Move randomly to new locations 
Calculate ∆𝑓  𝑓𝑛+1 Ω𝑛+1 − 𝑓𝑛 Ω𝑛  
Accept the new solution if better 
      If not improved 
                Generate a random number 𝑟  
                Accept if 𝑒−
∆𝑓
𝑇 > 𝑟 
end if 
Record best Ω  and 𝑓   
Update Temperature, 𝑛 ← 𝑛 + 1 
end while 
end 
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compute the values of  , iter iterlcs lcsp k , and  
iter
lcsd  by using algorithm presented in Figure 
3-7. 
3.5.2.3. Stopping criterion 
Various stopping criteria have been developed in the literature. A popular 
stopping criteria and the temperature reaches a set value (such as 0.01). Another 
criterion can be completing a predetermined number of iterations. In this chapter, a 
combination of these two criteria is considered in which we stop at the earlier of the 
temperature reaching 0.01 or the completion of 100 (350) iterations for small (large) 
size problems.  We discuss this condition and the convergence of SA algorithm in 
more detail in Section 3.6.1.  
3.5.2.4. SA Algorithm 
According to above explanation, the SA algorithm is outlined in the Figure 3-13. 
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Figure 3-13  Pseudo code of the SA algorithm 
3.5.3. Commercial Software 
The optimization problem is modeled by using the AMPL mathematical 
programming language and solved with Gurobi 4.5.6. Each problem instance is solved 
on four cores (threads=4) of a Dell Optiplex 980 with an Intel Core i7 860 Quad @ 
2.80GHz and 16GB RAM. The operating system is Windows 7 Enterprise 64-bit. In 
1. Initialize the parameters of the annealing schedule (Initial temperature, final temperature and total 
number of iterations) 
2. Generate an initial solution by determining vector  by the represented constructive or 
improvement heuristics and define relevant  total cost  
3. ; Temperature Initial Temperature 
4. while Temperature > Final Temperature or iter < total number of iterations do 
5. while done=false 
6.  Number of zero elements in vector and  
7.  Number of one elements in vector and  
8.  Generate a Random Number 
9. if   
10. create a new solution using SA-swap method and return and  
11. done true 
12. else if    and  
13. create a new solution using SA-add method and return and  
14. done true 
15. else if    and  
16. create a new solution using SA-remove method and return and  
17. done true 
18. else if  and   
19. create a new solution using SA-2swap method and return and  
20. done true 
21. end while  
22. Obtain the values of , and  by using SCD-Sub. 
23. if then  ,  
24. Update Temperature 
25. end while 
26. return the final solution 
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our computational analysis, we terminate Gurobi when the CPU time limit of 14,400 
seconds is reached. Table 3-1 summarizes the results from the solution, and the 
discussion is presented in Section 3.6. 
3.6. Computational Result 
In this section, we perform computational experiments to assess the 
effectiveness of the algorithms. In Section 3.5.1, we presented three heuristics (BGH, 
SGH, and CBGH) to determine set of selected facilities, x, and also three heuristics 
(FSIH, GIH, and RGIH) to determine the set of inspections to conduct, z. By 
combining these six heuristics, we construct nine different heuristics for determining x 
and z. For instance, our first heuristic can be denoted as BGH&FSIH. Finally, we 
employ the greedy heuristic presented in Figure 3-7 to solve SCD-Sub. All the 
algorithms were implemented and executed in MATLAB 7.9 (2009b) and tested on a 
single core of a Dell OptiPlex 980 computer running the Windows 7 Enterprise 64 bit 
operating system with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU860@ 2.80GHz, and 8GB RAM.  
We consider twelve sets of problems with ten data instances in each. Hence, 
we solve 120 instances of varying sizes as illustrated in Table 3-1. The second, third 
and the fourth columns represent the size of the problems under consideration. We 
also report the average of the optimal value and average solution time for each set. 
Finally, the last column represents the total number of optimal solutions obtained 
from ten data instances. 
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Table 3-1 Test problems’ sizes and the corresponding optimum solution values and times 
Set no. 
No. of 
consumers 
No. of 
facilities 
No. 
of 
scenarios 
Avg. optimal 
value/best values found 
Avg. 
solution time (s) 
No. of optimal 
solutions in ten data 
instances 
1 2 2 4 3132033.5 0.01 10 
2 2 5 32 6031316.5 17.6 10 
3 2 10 1024 12190855.2* 11267.6 5 
4 5 2 4 3857839.1 0.02 10 
5 5 5 32 7130036.5 62.9 10 
6 5 10 1024 12632921.9* 13102.7 1 
7 10 2 4 4498383.3 0.02 10 
8 10 5 32 7248655.8 1504.8 9 
9 10 10 1024 13207650.1* ** 0 
10 20 2 4 5526660.8 0.03 10 
11 20 5 32 8503834.6 325.7 10 
12 20 10 1024 15095012.3* ** 0 
*: Average of best objective values found 
**: The CPU time exceeded the prescribed time limit of 14400 seconds.  
As observed from Table 3-1, increasing the number of facilities implies an 
increase in the number of scenarios and the size of the problem has a large impact on 
the solution time. For instance, for the case of ten consumers or twenty consumers and 
ten facilities, Gurobi did not return any optimal solutions within the prescribed time 
limit of 14400 seconds. This is also illustrated in Figure 3-14. In order to calculate the 
relative optimality gap, we use the objective function value that is provided by Gurobi 
when the prescribed time limit is reached. To assess each heuristic, we consider 
solution quality and solution (computational) time. For the solution quality, we 
consider a quality criterion which is the gap between the result of heuristic/SA and the 
optimal/best solution obtained from Gurobi. This gap is defined according to the 
following equation: 
 
    
 
      
%gap
   
SA or Heuristics Solution Best Found or Optimal Solution
Best Found or Optimal Solution

 . 
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Figure 3-14 Optimal solution time under different number of facilities 
Furthermore, given the random characteristic of GIH, RGIH, Local_x, VNS_p, 
and SA, the corresponding objective values and solution times are the average across 
thirty independent replications. Table 3-2 reports the result for 2 facilities and 2, 5, 10, 
and 20 consumers. Note that bold-faced values indicate achievement of the best 
objective value among constructive heuristics and improvement heuristics/SA, 
respectively. 
The results in Table 3-2 show that, regardless of the number of consumers, the 
heuristic algorithms always provide solutions within 3% of the solution found by 
Gurobi. Heuristic algorithms are fast and their solution time generally does not vary 
with the number of consumers. We see that SGH&FSIH and CBGH&FSIH 
algorithms provide better solution quality and Local_x does not provide any 
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improvement in the solution of the constructive heuristics. The VNS_p procedure 
provides better quality solutions than the Local_x, however, this improvement comes 
with an increase in the solution time. Another observation from Table 3-2 is that even 
though the solution time for SA algorithm is notably higher than the other algorithms, 
its performance are not as good as VNS_p when we limit the problem instances to 2 
facilities.  
 
  
 
4
5
 
Table 3-2 Comparison of algorithms results for 2 facilities 
    Constructive Heuristics Improv. Heuristic and Metaheuristic 
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L
o
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l_
x 
V
N
S
_
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S
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2
 C
o
n
su
m
er
s 
Min gap 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Avg. gap 0.40% 0.47% 0.22% 0.21% 0.64% 0.36% 0.36% 0.56% 0.25% 0.21% 0.06% 0.25% 
Max gap 0.89% 0.77% 1.59% 0.76% 2.49% 0.76% 0.56% 1.59% 0.59% 0.56% 0.09% 0.89% 
Avg. time (s) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.021 0.047 
5
 C
o
n
su
m
er
s 
Min gap 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Avg. gap 1.34% 1.59% 1.86% 0.97% 1.36% 1.33% 0.84% 1.08% 1.23% 0.84% 0.25% 0.55% 
Max gap 3.75% 3.62% 3.83% 3.83% 3.83% 3.83% 1.47% 2.53% 2.33% 1.47% 1.37% 1.47% 
Avg. time (s) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.044 0.047 
1
0
 C
o
n
su
m
er
s Min gap 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Avg. gap 0.96% 2.12% 0.68% 0.48% 2.19% 1.08% 0.48% 0.81% 1.08% 0.48% 0.05% 0.50% 
Max gap 4.77% 7.02% 1.84% 1.84% 7.02% 4.55% 1.84% 2.16% 2.84% 1.84% 0.40% 1.84% 
Avg. time (s) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.03 0.14 
2
0
 C
o
n
su
m
er
s Min gap 0.00% 0.00% 0.43% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Avg. gap 1.58% 1.58% 2.31% 1.58% 1.58% 1.97% 1.58% 1.90% 1.90% 1.58% 1.29% 1.58% 
Max gap 5.37% 5.37% 5.37% 5.37% 5.37% 5.37% 5.37% 5.37% 5.37% 5.37% 4.49% 5.37% 
Avg. time (s) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.023 0.117 
                    Bold-faced values indicate achievement of the average of the best solution gap. 
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We now evaluate the effectiveness of our algorithms for five facilities. The 
results are presented in Table 3-3. We observe that BGH&FSIH, BGH&GIH, and 
BGH&RGIH  do not perform well compare to other constructive heuristics. The 
reason is that in these three heuristics we use BGH to select all the facilities while the 
total demand can be satisfied by selecting fewer facilities. SGH&FSIH, SGH&GIH, 
and SGH&RGIH provide solutions on average within 8% of the best found solution 
with a remarkably fast solution time in comparison to the optimal solution time. Both 
Local_x and VNS_p are capable of improving the solution quality even for a larger 
number of consumers, with an average solution gap within 5% of the optimal 
solution. In particular, SA clearly provides the best overall solution cost for the range 
of problems tested and requires only a moderate extra computational time than other 
algorithms. SA achieves solutions which are on average within 3% of the optimality 
gap. For 5 facilities and  10C  , as shown in Table 3-1, we found 9 optimal solutions 
in ten data instances. Therefore, in Table 3-3 we show the gap with the optimal and 
best solutions individually. 
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Table 3-3 Comparison of algorithms results for 5 facilities 
    Constructive Heuristics 
Improv. Heuristic and  
Metaheuristic 
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2
 C
o
n
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m
er
s Min gap* 7.09% 7.09% 7.09% 0.52% 1.34% 1.34% 0.29% 0.29% 0.30% 0.29% 0.26% 0.14% 
Avg. gap* 16.05% 15.68% 15.74% 3.83% 3.99% 3.98% 2.37% 2.61% 2.49% 2.16% 1.92% 0.89% 
Max gap* 30.08% 30.08% 28.65% 12.36% 12.37% 12.32% 7.46% 7.53% 7.70% 6.40% 2.02% 1.08% 
Avg. time (s) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.01 0.066 0.146 
5
 C
o
n
su
m
er
s Min gap* 13.10% 14.38% 13.74% 1.00% 0.98% 1.45% 1.44% 2.38% 1.47% 0.58% 0.00% 0.04% 
Avg. gap* 18.37% 18.35% 18.30% 4.13% 4.20% 4.11% 4.52% 4.48% 4.38% 1.99% 1.23% 1.18% 
Max gap* 25.37% 25.33% 25.64% 7.78% 7.60% 7.54% 11.14% 11.11% 11.27% 3.50% 2.83% 2.66% 
Avg. time (s) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.173 0.208 
1
0
 C
o
n
su
m
er
s 
Min gap* 8.37% 9.70% 9.09% 1.50% 1.28% 3.24% 3.59% 3.69% 3.48% 1.44% 0.98% 0.43% 
Avg. gap* 14.24% 14.51% 14.90% 4.02% 4.41% 4.72% 7.81% 7.72% 7.37% 2.71% 2.21% 1.49% 
Max gap* 19.20% 18.13% 19.08% 6.08% 6.09% 6.60% 12.09% 11.44% 10.25% 3.59% 3.58% 2.21% 
Avg. gap w/ non-opt sol. ** 9.63% 9.70% 9.83% 2.17% 3.74% 3..86% 8.31% 8.70% 8.15% 1.03% 0.03% -0.11% 
Avg. time (s) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.014 0.318 0.709 
2
0
 C
o
n
su
m
er
s Min gap* 2.01% 2.01% 3.30% 3.12% 3.11% 4.02% 6.86% 6.87% 6.94% 1.97% 1.89% 1.75% 
Avg. gap* 9.70% 9.70% 10.91% 6.04% 6.02% 7.94% 12.75% 12.83% 13.78% 4.65% 3.53% 3.17% 
Max gap* 15.06% 15.06% 18.32% 12.69% 13.32% 13.91% 15.77% 15.77% 17.68% 9.41% 5.67% 5.37% 
Avg. time (s) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.029 0.635 1.049 
Bold-faced values indicate achievement of the best solution gap. 
 Italicized indicate a better solution than the best solution found by Gurobi within the time limit.  
*: Values indicate the average gap with optimal solutions found 
**:  Values indicate the average gap with the best solution found 
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Realistic sized problems are commonly larger than those tested above. Hence, 
we examine a larger size problem for ten facilities. In Table 3-1, we show that for set 
9 and set 12 we were not able to find the optimal solution for any of the ten instances 
in 14400 seconds. In addition, in set 3 and 5 only 50% and 10% of the data instances 
were solved to optimality, respectively. This indicates how increasing the number of 
facilities and correspondingly the number of scenarios has a significant impact on the 
solution time. We presented the result of algorithms for the tested problem in Table 
3-4.  
Negative values in Table 3-4 indicate that the heuristics or SA achieved a 
better solution than the best solution found by Gurobi. For ten facilities and 
 10,20C  , SGH&FSIH, SGH&GIH, and SGH&RGIH perform well based on the 
average solution gap. For the case of ten facilities and  2,5C   consumers 
CBGH&FSIH, CBGH&GIH, and CBGH&RGIH achieved a better performance. 
However, the SA solutions outperform those found by all the other algorithms, even 
though they require less computational time than SA. Also, the minimum and 
maximum gap is usually somewhat better for the SA. Hence, for large sized problems 
we recommend using the SA algorithm, although reasonable results can still be 
achieved by some of the algorithms. For ten facilities and  C 5 , we found only 1 
optimal solution in ten data instances. Hence, we separate the result for this data 
instance from the others and display the gap between the optimal solution and the 
algorithms in the corresponding row of Table 3-4. 
It is observable that the number of facilities and consequently the number of 
scenarios has a significant impact on the computational time in our model. However, 
the results indicate the effectiveness of the SA algorithm we proposed, particularly for 
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larger sized problems. For problems in practice (that can have even larger sizes), our 
SA heuristic shows promising results. 
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Table 3-4 Comparison of algorithms results for ten facilities 
    Constructive Heuristics 
Improv. Heuristic and  
Metaheuristic 
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&
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G
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C
B
G
H
&
R
G
IH
 
L
o
ca
l_
x 
V
N
S
_
P
 
S
A
 
2
 C
o
n
su
m
er
s 
Min gap* 20.01% 21.25% 20.52% 4.24% 4.17% 2.52% 0.46% 0.46% 0.43% 0.13% 0.09%  0.09% 
Avg. gap* 24.10% 24.02% 22.75% 7.04% 6.86% 6.57% 3.93% 3.89% 3.56% 1.14% 0.54%  0.12% 
Max gap* 29.06% 28.11% 28.00% 10.63% 8.72% 8.78% 9.65% 9.98% 9.29% 2.33% 1.24% 0.35% 
Avg. gap w/ non-opt sol. ** 21.17% 21.26% 21.20% 6.72% 6.69% 6.44% 3.21% 3.45% 3.14% 1.09% 0.47% -0.02% 
Avg. time (s) 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.218 3.838 4.075 
5
 C
o
n
su
m
er
s 
Avg. gap* 20.25% 21.42% 22.63% 8.41% 7.14% 5.94% 0.89% 0.89% 0.90% 0.89% 0.87% 0.85% 
Min gap w/ non-opt. sol. ** 10.37% 10.31% 0.70% 4.92% 4.32% 3.72% 0.89% 0.89% 0.90% 0.87% -0.31% -0.36% 
Avg. gap w/ non-opt. sol. ** 15.63% 15.69% 16.96% 5.18% 5.67% 5.62% 4.63% 4.62% 4.60% 1.93% 0.40% 0.38% 
Max gap w/ non-opt. sol. ** 25.23% 24.98% 24.70% 15.40% 9.52% 8.89% 8.67% 8.83% 9.78% 4.22% 1.40% 1.73% 
Avg. time (s) 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.196 9.068 16.907 
1
0
 C
o
n
su
m
er
s Min gap w/ non-opt. sol. ** 11.14% 11.08% 11.30% -3.89% -3.64% -2.58% -4.34% -4.43% -4.29% -4.49% -6.28% -6.52% 
Avg. gap w/ non-opt. sol. ** 18.25% 18.36% 17.75% 3.38% 3.38% 4.05% 5.20% 5.21% 5.59% 0.95% -0.37% -0.88% 
Max gap w/ non-opt. sol. ** 25.68% 25.58% 23.73% 8.54% 9.54% 10.95% 14.42% 12.95% 12.98% 5.87% 4.02% 1.73% 
Avg. time (s) 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.825 15.839 19.971 
2
0
 C
o
n
su
m
er
s Min gap w/ non-opt. sol. ** -0.89% -0.83% -0.15% -12.02% -11.99% -10.70% -7.63% -7.59% -5.52% -13.33% -13.33% -14.28% 
Avg. gap w/ non-opt. sol. ** 11.26% 11.30% 11.77% -1.85% -1.74% 0.58% 4.59% 4.62% 5.37% -2.34% -2.76% -3.77% 
Max gap w/ non-opt. sol. ** 17.78% 17.80% 18.06% 2.70% 2.70% 5.45% 17.03% 17.05% 17.03% 2.42% 2.37% 0.59% 
Avg. time (s) 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 2.266 35.945 44.989 
Bold-faced values indicate achievement of the best solution gap. 
   Italicized indicate a better solution than the best solution found by Gurobi within the time limit.  
*: Values indicate the average gap with optimal solutions found 
**:  Values indicate the average gap with the best solution found  
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Figure 3-15 Gap of the algorithms under different number of facilities
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Figure 3-16 Solution time of the algorithms under different number of facilities 
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3.6.1. The Convergence of the SA  
We discussed the settings of SA parameters in Section 3.5.2.  In this section, 
the convergence of the SA algorithm is verified for the specific cases of    0.95 and 
0.75. We also limit the number of iterations to 350 in order to focus on the early 
convergence. The result is illustrated in Figure 3-17. Note that the presented results in 
Figure 3-17 are the average of ten independent runs. We observe that the SA with 
  0.75 converges to a better solution faster than the SA with   0.95. Figure 3-17 
also indicates that setting the number of iterations on 350 iterations is appropriate as 
the algorithm converged prior to this value. 
 
Figure 3-17 Convergence curves of SA for ten facilities and five customers 
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3.7. Results of Algorithms Comparison 
The performance of the 9 different heuristics with improvement heuristics and 
SA is compared in this section. The test problems attempted are classified into two 
sizes (problem structures): 
i. Medium: 5 facilities 5 consumers. 
ii. Large: ten facilities ten consumers. 
Note that the data used in the analyses are ten data instances we defined in Section 
3.6.  
The normal probability plots of the residuals indicate that the normality 
assumption for conducting an analysis of variance (ANOVA) is not satisfied. Thus, a 
nonparametric method (Kruskal-Walli) to compare the algorithms is used. The 
Kruskal-Wallis procedure is carried out to test the following hypothesis: 
H0: "There is not a difference in the total cost obtained for the problem instances 
using the 9 different heuristics with improvement heuristics and SA." 
H1:  "There is a difference in the total cost obtained for the problem instances 
using the 9 different heuristics with improvement heuristics and SA." 
A significance level if 0.05 is used for each test. The results of Kruskal-Wallis test for 
both the medium sized problem and the large sized problem indicate that there is 
enough statistical evidence that at least one of the algorithms tends to yield a different 
total cost than the others for both the medium sized problem and the large sized 
problem.  
A Pairwise Wilcoxon rank sum test (also known as the Mann-Whitney U test) 
is conducted to compare the performance of each of a pair of presented algorithms. 
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The results are presented in Table (a) and Table (b) in Appendix B. The results for the 
medium sized problem indicate that, SA is outperformed by all constructive heuristics 
except SGH&FSIH, SGH&GIH, and SGH&RGIH. However, the results show that 
there is no significant difference among the SA, VNS_p, and Local_x. Among the 
constructive heuristics SGH&FSIH, SGH&GIH, and SGH&RGIH is recommended 
for the medium size problems. For large size problems SA outperforms the 
constructive heuristics and the Local_x at the 5% level. However, SA and VNS_p are 
marginally insignificant (p-value=0.056). Therefore, SGH&FSIH and SGH&GIH are 
also recommended for larger size problems. 
3.8. Conclusions and Future Research  
In response to some catastrophic events, particularly in 
healthcare/pharmaceutical supply chains, Chapter 3 addresses a supply chain network 
design to hedge against the risk of supply disruptions and sending tainted materials to 
consumers. We considered a mixed-integer stochastic programming model with 
capacitated facilities. The model was formulated as a two-stage optimization problem.  
The aim of the model consists of the facility selection, actual capacity allocation 
among the consumers, and determination of inspection policy with the objective of 
minimizing the total cost. The impact of supply/capacity uncertainty is explicitly 
modeled in all our models in order to design a reliable supply chain network. To 
capture the uncertainty, a scenario-based approach was presented. 
Experience from solving the problem using commercial software indicated 
that the number of facilities, and consequently the number of scenarios, has a 
significant impact on the computational time. As a result, we developed several 
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heuristic methods and a metaheuristic approach to effectively solve the presented 
model. 
Based on our computational studies, the SA approach is not efficient in terms 
of solution quality and solution time for the small sized problems or small number of 
scenarios. However, some of the heuristics, in  particular SGH&FSIH, SGH&GIH, 
SGH&RGIH and CBGH&FSIH, achieved good solution qualities in a more 
reasonable time when compared to the optimal or best found solution. Local_x  and 
VNS_p were able to improve the solutions obtained from constructive heuristics. 
Therefore, constructive and improvement heuristics are preferable on small sized 
problems. However, for practical sized problems, i.e. ten facilities and more, SA 
outperforms constructive and improvement heuristics, even though it requires higher 
computational time. 
There are several interesting future research directions. We assumed a 
deterministic demand in our model whereas in real world this may not be a valid 
assumption.  Moreover, we assumed an inspection and discard policy but in some 
industries like automotive and electronics industry this can be considered as 
inspection and fixed policy where items defected after detecting can be repaired. 
Another extension is to develop other metaheuristic techniques such as Genetic 
Algorithm or Tabu Search to compare their effectiveness with SA algorithm.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. Risk Minimization in Supply Chain Network Design Problems: A 
Metaheuristic Approach 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we solely identified the set of decisions made by a 
risk-neutral decision-maker in order to minimize the expected cost. In the literature, 
however, it has been indicated that minimizing expected cost is not always 
satisfactory from a practical point of view, and managers in the real world are also 
concerned with the other objectives such as downside risk minimization.  
In this chapter, a risk-averse policy wherein, rather than selecting facilities and 
identifying the pertinent supplier-consumer assignments that minimize the expected 
cost, the decision-maker uses a Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) approach to 
measure and quantify risk and to define what comprises a worst-case scenario. The 
CVaR methodology allows the decision-maker to specify to what extent worst-case 
scenarios should be avoided and the corresponding costs associated with such a 
policy. We first reformulate the problem SCD as a mean-risk model. After 
introducing the underlying optimization models, we present computational analysis to 
compare the results of the risk-averse (SCD-CVaR) and risk-neutral (SCD) policies. 
In addition, we provide several managerial insights.  
In this chapter, the CVaR description and the mathematical formulations of the 
risk-averse policy are introduced in Section 2 and Section 3, respectively. In Section 3 
the data generation method is presented. Solution procedures, computational 
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experiments and sensitivity analysis are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 
includes our conclusions and our recommendations for future work. 
4.2. The Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) Concept 
The CVaR builds upon the measure called Value-at-Risk (VaR). VaR is a 
popular method to measure risk in a portfolio. VaR focuses on all outcomes below a 
specific level. Therefore, given a probability  , VaR answers the question: “What is 
the maximum loss associated with 100 %  probability over a target horizon?” 
Despite the popularity of VaR in finance and risk management, this technique has a 
few important undesirable properties. Artzner et al. [86] pointed out that VaR is not a 
coherent measure of risk since it fails to hold the sub-additivity property. Therefore, 
the VaR of a portfolio can be higher than the sum of VaRs of the individual assets in 
the portfolio (i.e.,      VaR VaR VaRx y x y    where  .f  is the risk measure). 
Moreover, VaR is difficult to optimize when it is calculated using the scenario-based 
approach [87]. These reasons have led us to use an alternative measure, CVaR.   
The CVaR measure leads to a minimization of VaR because CVaR is greater 
than or equal to VaR (see Figure 4-1 and equation (25)). The CVaR measure 
considers those outcomes in which losses over a specific period of time exceed VaR. 
In other words, we allow  1 100%  of the outcomes to exceed VaR, and the 
average value of these outcomes is represented by CVaR. Generally,   indicates the 
level of conservatism that a decision-maker is willing to adopt. As   approaches one, 
the range of acceptable worst-cases becomes narrower in the corresponding 
optimization problem. Figure 4-1 illustrates the relationship between CVaR and VaR:  
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CVaR is always greater than or equal to VaR. Moreover, the distribution is skewed to 
the right and therefore, the number of worst-case outcomes is reduced when   is 
increased. 
 
Figure 4-1 Illustration of relation between CVaR and VaR  
 
We provide the formal definition of VaR and CVaR in the following equation. 
Consider, for example, a random variable x  that represents loss from an outcome. 
Given a risk level  , the VaR of the random variable s  is given by 
    VaR : min :Pr 1 .x x                                                                            (22) 
Given the equation (22), the CVaR at risk level  , is defined by Rockafellar and 
Uryasev  [87] as  
     CVaR | VaR .x x x x                                                                                (23) 
1 
1 
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Rockafellar and Uryasev [87] proved that for a minimization problem, the 
CVaR can be computed as  
    
1
CVaR min max ,0 .
1
x x  

 
   
 
                                                            (24) 
In [87], Rockafellar and Uryasev also proved that for a set of pre-defined 
scenarios with corresponding probabilities, equation (24) can be transformed into a 
linear programming model by introducing the auxiliary variables  1,...,i i N   as 
  
1
1
min
1
N
i i
i
 
 


                                                                         (25) 
        subject to:     ,i iL i                                                      (26) 
         0 ,i i                                                                        (27) 
where iL  is the realization of the expected loss related to scenario i.  
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Figure 4-2 Representation of CVaR and VaR for a finite set of scenarios (discrete case) 
4.3. The CVaR Model 
In expanding the formulation of the SCD model for a risk-averse objective, we 
define  as a decision variable denoting the optimal value for VaR. The CVaR is a 
weighted measure of   and the costs greater than  . We define s  as the tail loss 
for scenario s, where tail loss is defined as the amount by which the loss in scenario s 
exceeds  . Given Equation (25) and the SCD model, a risk-averse supply chain 
network model with unreliable supply sources is defined as  
 
1
SCD-CVaR min    
1
s s
s S
p 
 



                (28)
 
subject to: 
  1  , lc ls lcs lc lcs lc lcs l ls
l L c C l L
s l l
l L
x q p k d n s Szf    
  
              (29) 
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 1 , ,ls lcs lcs lcs l l
c C
q p k sx l L Sd 

        
             (30)
 
, , ,lcs lcs ls lcs c C lk sq Ld p S                        (31) 
( ) (1 ), , ,lcs ls lcs lsk r p M c C l L sz S                            (32) 
( ) (1 ,), ,lcs ls ls lcs lsd q r p M c C l L sz S                              (33) 
, , ,( )lcs ls c C l L sd M z S                         (34) 
 1 , ,ls lcs lcs c
l L
c C sq p k b S

       
                              (35) 
, ,ls lx Sz l L s                           (36)
, , 0, , ,lcs lcs lcs c C l L sk p Sd      (37)
 0,1 , ,lsz l L s S                            (38) 
 0,1 ,lx l L                                       (39) 
0s s S                                             (40) 
In the above formulation, constraint set (29) computes the tail cost for scenario 
s.  Constraint set (40) indicates that we only consider the scenarios in which the loss 
exceeds  . 
4.4. Solution Procedures 
4.4.1. Exact Solution by Using Commercial Software 
The optimization problem is modeled in the AMPL mathematical 
programming language and solved with Gurobi 4.5.6. Each problem instance is solved 
on four cores (threads=4) of a Dell Optiplex 980 with an Intel Core i7 860 Quad @ 
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2.80GHz and 16GB RAM. The operating system is Windows 7 Enterprise 64-bit. In 
our computational analysis, we terminate Gurobi when the CPU time limit of 14,400 
seconds is reached.  
All of our computational experiments are based on the data that was generated 
from the procedure presented in Section 3.4. We considered ten data instances for a 
supply chain network consisting of five facilities and five consumers. We selected 
five levels of  : 0.50, 0.65, 0.75, 0.85 and 0.95. Results comparing the derived 
solutions from the SCD model with those from the SCD-CVaR model, under various 
risk-level values, are summarized in Table 4-1.  
4.4.2. Computational Experiments for Exact Models 
This section presents numerical studies on both the SCD and the SCD-CVaR 
models, as outlined above, in order to highlight the differences between the risk-
neutral and risk-averse policies. Our observations indicate that higher values of 
imply a higher level of risk-aversion and a narrower range of worst-case scenarios. 
From Table 4-1, it can be observed that the average expected cost, VaR, and CVaR 
increase with associated increases to   values. This is because, as a decision-maker 
or a supply chain designer becomes more risk-averse, he or she is willing to accept a 
higher total cost in order to avoid more worst-case scenarios. Hence, our derived 
SCD-CVaR model restricts the number of scenarios that exceed VaR, and the right-
hand tail cost will be minimized at the price of increasing the total expected cost (see 
Figure 4-1).   
In Table 4-1, we have divided the expected total cost into the fixed cost, 
expected untainted delivered cost, the expected tainted penalty cost, the expected 
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discard cost, and the expected inspection cost. As per the results obtained, the fixed 
cost increases with respect to increasing risk-level  . The reason for this increase is 
that, for higher values of risk-level, the average number of selected facilities gradually 
increases. However, in  0.85,0.95SCD-CVaR , even though the average number of 
selected facilities is equal, the corresponding average fixed costs are different. The 
difference is because increasing the risk-level   also leads to the selection of 
different types of facilities. In Figure 4-3, we show the output for one data instance in 
order to illustrate this observation. We notice that the number of selected facilities 
and/or the type of the facility changes with respect to the value of  . For instance, in 
the 0.95SCD-CVaR  model, Facility 1 is not selected. In contrast, in the 
0.85SCD-CVaR  model, Facility 5 is not selected, which is a facility with a higher 
fixed cost.   
Another key observation from Table 4-1 (also illustrated in Figure 4-4 and 
Figure 4-5) is that becoming more risk-averse results in remarkable increases in the 
cost of shipping untainted products to consumers. This implies that capacity allocation 
decisions change by varying  . We observe growth in the cost of inspection with 
respect to level of risk aversion level particularly for  0.85,0.95 . This increase 
noticeably indicates that increasing   leads to conducting more inspections in the 
facilities. Additionally, a remarkable reduction in the expected penalty cost of 
shipping tainted products is noticeable. Given Equations (5)–(8), we notice that lcsk
and lcsd are auxiliary decision variables that depend solely on variables lcsp and lsz . 
Therefore, implementation of more inspections at the facilities and larger values of 
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shipping untainted products results in the discarding of more tainted products and, 
subsequently, a reduction in the number of tainted products shipped. Furthermore, 
inspection decisions at the facilities under different scenarios change as the value of  
  changes. 
Table 4-1 A comparison between optimal solutions to the SCD and SCD-CVaR models with 
various risk-levels. 
 
SCD 0.50
SCD-CVaR
 
0.65SCD-CVaR
 
0.75SCD-CVaR
 
0.85SCD-CVaR
 
0.95SCD-CVaR
 
CVaR - 7,080,578 7,226,298 7,382,727 7,540,617 7,797,082 
VaR - 6,673,971 6,850,485 6,992,332 7,335,176 7,587,006 
Avg. expected total cost 6,587,944 6,790,520 6,910,247 6,972,212 7,214,093 7,250,803 
      Avg. fixed cost 5,210,752 5,694,548 5,861,480 5,943,178 6,247,912 6,257,492 
      Avg. expected untainted delivered  
cost 
592,174 632,791 643,899 652,651 681,041 687,738 
      Avg. expected  tainted penalty cost 755,792 403,878 339,150 304,849 204,321 228,408 
      Avg. expected inspection cost 26,185 52,314 58,365 63,418 68,202 68,566 
      Avg. expected discard cost 3,041 6,988 7,353 8,117 8,685 8,599 
Avg. no. of selected facilities 3.4 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.1 4.1 
 
Figure 4-3 Fixed cost vs. reliability on Facility Selection at various risk levels 
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As an example, let us consider Scenario 21, where all facilities are in State 1, 
except for Facility 3 and Facility 5, and Scenario 32 where all facilities are in State 1. 
As illustrated in Figure 4-6, in the SCD model for scenario 21, inspection is 
implemented in Facility 3 and Facility 5, whereas in the 
0.95SCD-CVaR , inspection is 
implemented only in Facility 5. Furthermore, in Scenario 32, inspection is performed 
in all the facilities for 
0.95SCD-CVaR , while only three facilities are inspected in the 
SCD model.  
Finally, recall that increasing   leads to a higher average number of selected 
facilities. This can be justified because a risk-averse decision-maker provides more 
capacity (by selection of more facilities) in order to be able both to perform more 
inspections and to discard more tainted products and still satisfy the total demand. The 
most salient conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that the risk-averse 
policy results in different strategic and tactical decisions compared to the risk-neutral 
policy, which is probably a more suitable design for a pharmaceutical supply network. 
However, we should note that the magnitude of change is also highly dependent upon 
the value of the risk level. In the next section, we utilize a sensitivity analysis for the 
further investigation of this subject. 
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Figure 4-4 Average cost of selection facilities for various risk-level values 
 
Figure 4-5  Expected costs for various risk-level values 
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 Figure 4-6  Inspection decisions at the facilities under different scenarios and various risk 
levels 
4.4.3. Sensitivity Analysis of the Exact Models 
Our computational experiments display the sensitivity of the solution relative 
to the various values of the risk level (i.e.,  ). In this section, we analyze the SCD 
and the SCD-CVaR outcomes for various settings of some of the parameters in order 
to provide insights that can assist decision-makers. Note that we compare the results 
of our sensitivity analysis to the results obtained in our computational analysis, which 
we refer to as the “base case.” We also perform the single-factor experiment in order 
to observe the effect of each cost factor. To make the results more interpretable and 
for the sake of simplicity, we consider the SCD model along with 
 0.50,0.85SCD-CVaR
in our sensitivity analysis. Table 4-2 presents the settings for each parameter used in 
the sensitivity analysis.  
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Table 4-2 Parameter setting for sensitivity analysis 
Parameter Range (s) of the Parameters 
Fixed cost of selecting a facility (
lf )    U 300k,500k ,U 2M,3M  
Fixed cost of implementing an inspection (
ln )    U 25k,50k ,U 75k,150k  
Cost shipping tainted products ( lc )    U 5k,10k ,U 15k,30k  
4.4.3.1. Varying fixed cost of selecting a facility ( lf ) 
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of the fixed cost. For this purpose, 
let us first assume that our facilities are small-size facilities where the fixed cost of 
selecting a facility is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution between $300,000 
and $500,000. We also consider larger size facilities where the fixed cost of selecting 
a facility is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution between $2,000,000 and 
$3,000,000. Note that we keep all other parameters constant. We use the same ten 
data instances that were previously described, changing only the fixed cost of 
selecting a facility. The result is summarized in Table 4-3. Note that the numbers in 
parentheses denote the reduction or growth in the costs compared to values obtained 
in the base case. 
For the case where  U 300k,500klf  , the average number of selected 
facilities increases as the fixed cost decreases in both the SCD model and SCD-CVaR 
model. We do not observe a notable change in the average expected cost of shipping 
untainted products. We observe a remarkable reduction in both the average expected 
penalty cost of shipping tainted products and the average expected cost of discarding 
tainted products, particularly in the SCD and 
0.50SCD-CVaR models. This is a 
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consequence of an increase in the average number of selected facilities as well as the 
implementation of more inspections at these facilities. For 
0.85SCD-CVaR , we observe 
an increase in the average expected cost of inspection and a slight change in the 
average expected cost of discarding tainted products. We observe that the ability to 
reduce the selecting cost of facilties can result (i.e., considering smaller size facilities) 
in increasing the average number of selected facilities and subsequently 
implementation of more inspection at the facilities particulary in the risk-neutral 
policy.  
We notice that the average number of selected facilities drastically decreases 
when  U 2m,3mlf  . Furthermore, we observe a considerable increase in the 
average expected penalty cost of shipping tainted products and a decrease in the 
average expected cost of discarding tainted products, which are the consequence of 
considerable reduction in the implementation of inspection at the facilities. The reason 
for these changes is because of the reduction in the average number of selected 
facilities, which causes the decrease of the available capacity. Hence, the inspection at 
the facilities is refused and the tainted products are not discarded in order to provide 
enough capacity to be able to satisfy the total demand of consumers (i.e., to satisfy 
constraint set (9)). As a result, we observe that higher fixed costs of selecting a 
facility results in a reduction in implementation of inspection at the facilities and 
subsequently, increased quantities of tainted products reaching consumers.         
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Table 4-3 Comparison between optimal solutions to the SCD and SCD-CVaR models at varying fixed cost. 
  
SCD   0.50SCD-CVaR                      0.85
SCD-CVaR  
 300k,500klf     2 ,3lf M M     300k,500klf      2 ,3lf M M    300k,500klf    2 ,3lf M M  
CVaR - - 
 
2,699,462 11,185,483  2,986,515 12,304,789 
VaR - - 
 
2,441,975 10,398,995  2,769,522 12,016,346 
Avg. expected total cost 2,538,062 10,514,286  2,575,433 10,541,546  2,580,181 11,156,932 
      Avg. fixed cost 1,642,266 8,994,122  1,675,595 9,021,022  1,678,277 9,877,415 
      Avg. expected untainted delivered  cost 587,447 597,569  627,086 619,172  665,388 682,336 
      Avg. expected  tainted penalty cost 232,563(-70%) 907,643(20%)  191,559(-53%) 884,026(118%)  152,864(-26%) 562,063(146%) 
      Avg. expected inspection cost 68,523(162%) 13,203(-50%)  73,607(41%) 15,126(-70%)  74,960(10%) 30,200(-55%) 
      Avg. expected discard cost 7,262(138%) 1,748(-42%)  7,587(9%) 2,201(-68%)  8,690(0.1%) 4,918(-43%) 
Avg. no. of selected facilities 4.1 3.5  4.1 3.5  4.2 3.6 
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4.4.3.2. Varying fixed cost of implementing an inspection (
ln ) 
In Section 3.4, the cost of inspection at each facility was uniformly distributed 
over the range of $50,000 and $100,000. We consider two different ranges for our 
sensitivity analysis. In the first range, we will have a 50% reduction in the cost of 
inspection (i.e., inspection cost drawn from U[25k,50k]), and in the second range, we 
consider a 50% increase in the cost of inspection (i.e., inspection cost drawn from 
U[75k,150k]). Table 4-4 presents our findings for various levels of  . The numbers 
in parentheses denote the reduction or growth in the costs compared to values 
obtained in the “base case.” 
For  U 25k,50kln  , despite some slight variations, we observe that average 
fixed cost, average expected penalty cost of shipping tainted products, and average 
number of selected facilities are all insensitive to the change. In the SCD and 
0.50SCD-CVaR  
models, we note that while the inspection cost decreases 
considerably, the average discard cost increases and the average expected penalty cost 
of shipping tainted products decreases, which is more considerable in the  
0.50SCD-CVaR  
model. We also note an increase in the average expected cost of 
discarding tainted products which implies that the reduction in cost of implementing 
inspection results in more inspections being performed, as would be expected.  
For  U 75k,150kln  , we observe a reduction in the number of selected 
facilities as  increases. This reduction is also valid when compared to the base case 
and the case where  U 25k,50kln  . We observe that, for high inspection cost cases 
and for higher values of  , the SCD-CVaR model tends to select more reliable 
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facilities, whereas for lower inspection costs, the tendency is toward selecting 
facilities with larger capacities. Hence, we observe lower fixed costs for 
 75k,150kln  compared to the base case and also  25k,50kln  . The 
corresponding analysis is presented in more detail in Chapter 5. The results also show 
fewer inspections implemented in both the SCD and 0.50SCD-CVaR  models and 26 
percent and 11 percent decreases in the average expected costs of discarding tainted 
products for 0.50   and 0.85  , respectively.  This reduction results in a nearly 
six percent increase in the average expected penalty cost of shipping tainted products, 
which is still 56 percent less than what we observe for 0.50  . The obtained result 
indicates that managers and decision-makers should either maintain inspection cost at 
the lowest possible value or become more risk-averse when the cost of inspection 
implementation is high. 
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Table 4-4 Comparison between optimal solutions to the SCD and SCD-CVaR models at varying inspection cost. 
  
SCD   0.50SCD-CVaR                      0.85
SCD-CVaR  
 25k,50kln     75k,150kln      25k,50kln         75k,150kln 
     25k,50kln     75k,150kln   
CVaR - - 
 
6,374,835 7,156,224 
 
5,959,766 7,641,170 
VaR - - 
 
5,980,693 6,472,782 
 
5,777,634 7,355,175 
Avg. expected total cost 6,569,842 6,620,171 
 
6,778,385 6,631,208 
 
7,170,790 6,875,733 
      Avg. fixed cost 5,210,752 5,210,752 
 
5,728,242 5,438,567 
 
6,247,912 5,900,643 
      Avg. expected untainted delivered  cost 592,205 592,152 
 
627,905 628,970 
 
673,660 672,033 
      Avg. expected  tainted penalty cost 751,566(-0.6%) 775,485(3%) 
 
389,182(-3%) 500,763(25%) 
 
203,685(-0.3%) 217,280(6%) 
      Avg. expected inspection cost 12,265(-52%) 38,865(48%) 
 
26,052(-50%) 57,763(10%) 
 
36,790(-45%) 78,032(13%) 
      Avg. expected discard cost 3054(0.4%) 2,942(-4%) 
 
7003(0.4%) 5,144(-26%) 
 
8,743(0.7%) 7,745(-11%) 
Avg. no. of selected facilities 3.4 3.4 
 
3.8 3.6 
 
4.1 3.9 
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4.4.3.3. Varying penalty cost of shipping tainted products ( lc ) 
Table 4-5 reports the relative differences in the optimal expected costs and the 
average number of selected facilities with respect to changes in the penalty cost of 
shipping tainted products. For  U 5k,10klc  , there is a considerable reduction in 
the average number of selected facilities for both 0.50SCD-CVaR  and 
0.95SCD-CVaR . However, for the SCD model, the average number of selected 
facilities is insensitive to the change. We also notice a remarkable reduction in the 
inspection cost and the average expected discard cost, particularly in the SCD and 
0.50SCD-CVaR  
models. This reduction implies the implementation of fewer 
inspections at the facilities. These observations indicate that the use of a low penalty 
cost for shipping tainted products results in decisions that do not support the detection 
of tainted materials nor the selection of enough facilities to protect against requiring 
shipping tainted products. 
For  U 15k,30klc  , we observe a notable increase in the number of 
selected facilities in the SCD and 0.50SCD-CVaR models. We also notice increase in 
the inspection cost and the average expected discard cost in the SCD and 
0.50SCD-CVaR models. However, in the 0.95SCD-CVaR model, the average number 
of selected facilities and the average expected penalty cost of shipping tainted 
products are both insensitive to the change. The results decidedly indicate that 
decision-makers should consider the high penalty cost of shipping tainted products 
when dealing with both the risk-neutral policy and the risk-averse policy. Our result 
also supports the position that managers and decision-makers should avoid 
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considering a low penalty cost for shipping tainted products when they are willing to 
be risk-averse. 
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Table 4-5 Comparison between optimal solutions to the SCD and SCD-CVaR models at varying shipping tainted cost. 
  
SCD   0.50SCD-CVaR                      0.85
SCD-CVaR  
 5k,10klc     15k,30klc      5k,10klc         15k,30klc 
     5k,10klc     15k,30klc   
CVaR - - 
 
5,595,021 6,990,944  6,313,611 7,438,295 
VaR - - 
 
5,340,650 6,604,175  6,138,267 7,060,782 
Avg. expected total cost 6,000,543 6,605,522  6,044,112 6,737,116  5,923,728 6,806,913 
      Avg. fixed cost 5,068,814 5,373,692  5,090,760 5,887,011  4,986,871 5,938,188 
      Avg. expected untainted delivered  cost 582,557 485,849  614,505 516,871  622,027 559,015 
      Avg. expected  tainted penalty cost 340,375 (-55%) 698,080(-8%)  326,791(-19%) 258,296(-36%)  298,379(42%) 232,984(14%) 
      Avg. expected inspection cost 7,971(-70%) 43,276(65%)  10,916(-79%) 67,946(30%)  15,086(-77%) 68,406(0.2%) 
      Avg. expected discard cost 826(-72%) 4,625(52%)  1,140(-83%) 6,991(0.05%)  1,365(-84%) 8,421(-2%) 
Avg. no. of selected facilities 3.3 3.7  3.3 4.0  3.4 4.1 
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4.4.3.4. Experiments 
This section presents a few experiments on both the SCD and the SCD-CVaR 
models.  
Experiment 1. Fixed capacity and varying reliability of the facilities 
The demand for each consumer is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution 
between 100 and 300 units. We consider an identical constant value for the capacity 
of the facilities in order to maintain the ratio of the total capacity 35% higher than the 
total demand before implementing inspection and discarding tainted items. 
Furthermore, since the cost of selecting a facility is correlated with the capacity, 
hence this cost is constant and identical for all the facilities as well. As we observe in 
Figure 4-7, for higher values of risk-level  , facilities with higher reliability have 
higher likelihood of selection.  Note that the reliability of the facilities is drawn from a 
discrete uniform distribution between 0.50 and 0.95. 
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Figure 4-7 Effect of reliability and risk-level on facility selection 
Experiment 2. Varying capacity and fixed reliability of the facilities 
In our second observation, we maintain the reliability of the facilities at a constant 
rate while varying the capacity of the facilities. The result is illustrated in Figure 4-8. 
We observe that, the number of selected facilities changes with respect to the value of  
  and for higher values of risk-level, the number of selected facilities increases. We 
also observe the tendency toward selecting facilities with larger capacities and also 
providing more available capacity for high values of  .  
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Figure 4-8 Effect of capacity and risk-level on facility selection 
4.4.4. Heuristic 
4.4.4.1. A Metaheuristic Approach 
From solving the SCD-CVaR problem using commercial software we 
observed that, the number of facilities, and consequently the number of scenarios, has 
a significant impact on the computational time (see Table 4-7 as an example). As a 
result, we develop a metaheuristic-based solution approaches for analyzing this 
challenging, practically-motivated problem.  
In this research, a simulated annealing (SA) is proposed to solve the SND-
CVaR problem. Our SA operates in five phases as follows: 
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 Phase 1: determine set of selected facilities ( lx ) 
 Phase 2: determine the inspection decisions ( lsz ) 
 Phase 3: calculate lcsp , lcsk and lcsd or capacity allocation   
 Phase 4: calculate VaR(   
 Phase 5: calculate SND-CVaR and evaluate the solution 
For phase 1 and phase 2, we utilize the neighborhood strategy which was 
discussed in Section 3.5.2. We apply the same neighborhood strategy to determine lsz . 
After the set of selected facilities and inspection decisions are fixed and known, we 
need to alloacte the available capacity to customers. We conduct the capacity 
allocation in a greedy fashion and in three steps as applied for SCD-Sub in Chapter 3. 
Recall that we followed three steps. In step 1, the demand vector and transportation 
cost are sorted. In step 2, the biggest demand is assign to smallest cost. And finally in 
step 3, decision variables lcsk and lcsd are computed. In phase 4, we use the following 
definition to calculate VaR (see [88]).  
Definition 1. Consider a set of scenarios 𝑆 where the likelihood of each scenario is s
. Let 𝐼    denote the  𝑡ℎ order statistic of the scenario sample (𝐼 1 ≤ 𝐼   ≤… ≤ 𝐼   ). 
The empirical cdf can be defined as follows: 
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One popular estimator of 𝑉𝑎𝑅    is the inverse of the above empirical cdf, i.e., 
𝑉𝑎𝑅     ?̂?−1    𝐼    where  
 −1
 
<  ≤
 
 
.  
The structure of the SA algorithm is presented in Figure 4-9. In the next section we 
conduct some computational analysis to evaluate the performance of the proposed SA.  
Initialisation
Set initial Temp, Final Temp, 
Max. Iterations
Generate Solution
Evaluate objective function
Improvement
Accept new 
solution
Accept new solution 
with a probability
Check for feasibility 
Stop criteria at outer loop
Return optimal solution
Cooling 
temperature T
Select Neighborhood
Yes No
Yes
No
Yes
No
 
Figure 4-9 SA algorithm applied to SCD-CVaR problem  
A computational experiment is conducted to test the performance of the SA 
procedure against the exact solution. For that experiment we employ two datasets 
where the first consists of 5 facilities and 5 consumers and the second consists of ten 
facilities and 5 consumers. We selected three levels of  : 0.50, 0.75, and 0.99.  
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The main observation from Table 4-6 is that the solution time decreases with 
increases in the  value of   in the exact solution. However, we observe a steady trend 
for the solution time in SA. In other word, in SA, the solution time is not a function of 
the value of   while the opposite is true when solving the SCD-CVaR model exactly. 
Figure 4-10 illustrates that the average fixed cost of the exact solution and SA 
solution increases by increasing  . This indicates that the number of selected 
suppliers increases with the risk-level   in order to increase the available capacity. 
From Figure 4-11 we also observe that the average cost of shipped untaited product in 
both exact solution and SA solution increases when the decision-maker is more risk-
averse.  
Table 4-6 Summary of SA result for SCD-CVaR problem 
  5 facilities and 5 consumers ten facilities and 5 consumers 
  
α=0.50 α=0.75 α=0.99 α=0.50 α=0.75 α=0.99 
E
x
ac
t 
S
o
lu
ti
o
n
 CVaR 7556517 7722731 8,745,430 13290672 13491974 14211457 
Average Solution Time (s) 62.8 63.6 8.1 >14400 >14400 >14400 
No. of optimal solutions in 5 
instances 
5 5 5 1 1 1 
S
A
 S
o
lu
ti
o
n
 
CVaR 7,856,700 8,277,300 9,081,600 13811436 14157678 14954556 
Average Solution Time (s) 1.43 1.48 1.48 62.2 64.8 61.6 
Gap-CVaR (%) 4.0 7.2 3.8 3.9 4.9 5.2 
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Figure 4-10 Fixed Cost – SA vs. Exact Solution 
 
 
Figure 4-11 Average expected untainted delivered products- SA solution vs. exact solution 
4.4.4.2. Sample Average Approximation 
Sample Average Approximation (SAA) is a solution method for stochastic 
optimization problems with large numbers of scenarios which was first proposed by 
Kleywegt et al. [89]. They analyzed the behavior of the SAA method when applied to 
stochastic discrete optimization problems. The basic idea of this method is to 
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randomly generate samples, then the expected objective function of the stochastic 
problem is approximated by these samples. The resulting sample average 
approximation problem is then solved by deterministic optimization techniques [90].  
Consider equation (41): 
   SAA min ,  l l
l L
w x f Q x s

                                                                  (41) 
s.t                               0,1 , ,lx l L                                                                        (42) 
The main idea of the SAA method is that by generating   samples 
1 2, ,..., Ns s s  of 
scenarios from 𝑆, the expected value function  ,E Q x s   ( where 
   
1
, ,
S
s
s
E Q x s Q x s

     ) is approximated by the sample average function 
 
1
,
N
n
n
Q x s
N


. 
Then we obtain the following problem: 
 
 
1
,
min
N
n
n
l l
l L
Q x s
x f
N




                                                                                           (43) 
Let *w and *x denote the optimal objective function value and the first-stage 
vector solution of the original problem (equation (41)). In the SAA method,   
independent batches, each of which consists of  scenarios, are generated and the 
SAA problem is solved  times repeatedly. Denote the objective values which are 
obtained at each time by 
1 2, ,..., MN N Nw w w , then let 
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1
1 M m
N N
m
w w
M 
                                                                                                           (44) 
signify the average of the  optimal values of the SAA problem. It is proven that 
  *NE w w [89,91,92]. Therefore, Nw  provides a statistical estimate of a lower bound 
of the optimal value of the true problem (see [75]). The variance of the estimator 
Nw
can be estimated by  
 
 
 
2
2
1
1
ˆ
1N
M
m
w N N
m
w w
M M


 

                                                                                 (45) 
The above procedure results in M different candidate solutions. It is natural to 
consider *x as one of the optimal solutions 
1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,..., Mx x x of the M of the SSA problem 
which has the smallest estimated objective value. Hence, we have 
  * 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆargmin , ,..., Mx x x x                                                                                         (46) 
We can also evaluate the quality of the solution by computing the following gap  
  *Nw w x                                                                                                                 (47) 
Furthermore, for any feasible point  , the objective value of  
 ,l l
l L
x f E Q x s

   
 
is an upper bound for *w . This upper bound can be estimated by 
equation (48) 
 
 
1
,
min
s.t (2)
N
n
n
N l l
l L
Q x s
w x f
N




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

                                                                           (48) 
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where N  is the sample size of scenarios and it is chosen to be significantly 
larger than   N       Given the above explanation, the SAA method applied in 
this research is presented in the following.  
We stated that increasing the number of facilities, and consequently the 
number of scenarios significantly increase the computational time of the SCD-CVaR 
model. Therefore, we apply the SAA method in addressing the large sized problems 
for identifying a good lower bound to the original problem.  
In this research the general SAA algorithm is implemented with some 
modifications to fit the problem studied. We denote this algorithm as modified-SAA. 
However, for the sake of comparison with the results of modified-SAA, we also 
present the result of the general SAA algorithm in Section 4.4.4.2.1. The 
modifications are summarized in the following. 
First, in Section 4.4 we mentioned that the optimization problem, SCD-CVaR, 
is modeled by using the AMPL mathematical programming language and solved with 
Gurobi 4.5.6. We terminate Gurobi when the CPU time limit of 14,400 seconds is 
reached. In this research, an estimate of the upper bound to equation (41), 
Nw  , can be 
derived by using the objective value of the solution to the SCD-CVaR which is 
reported by Gurobi. 
Second, in the general SAA algorithm a random scenario  1 2, ,..., NN s s s of 
realizations of the random vector s  is generated and an identical weight of 
1
N
is 
assigned to each single scenario (see [89]). In this research, we calculate the 
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probability of each scenario following the procedure presented in Section 3.4 where 
the probability (weight) is equal s .  
Figure 4-12 Scheme of modified-SAA algorithm for SCD-CVaR 
4.4.4.2.1. Computational Result of modified-SAA Algorithm 
To illustrate the applicability of the proposed modified-SAA method, a 
numerical experiment is conducted in this section. The modified-SAA algorithm is 
tested by using different combinations of sample sizes | | ∈ { , 1 ,    ,   } and 
| |   {1  ,   ,   , 1 }. The general SAA algorithm is tested by using the sample 
size | | ∈ {  ,   ,   ,1  ,    } and | |  1 . 
The SAA algorithm presented in Figure 4-12 implemented and executed in 
MATLAB 7.9 (2012) and tested on a single core of a Dell OptiPlex 980 computer 
running the Windows 7 Enterprise 64 bit operating system with an Intel(R) Core(TM) 
i7 CPU860@ 2.80GHz, and 8GB RAM.  
modified-SAA.  
 
1. Sample 𝑀 scenarios of size 𝑁 randomly from the scenario set  𝑆. Let  𝜔𝑀 be the set of 
sampled scenarios. 
2. Solve the SCD-CVaR problem with the reduced scenario set 𝜔𝑀 , and let be the 
probability of occurrence for scenario 𝑠 in set 𝜔𝑀. 
3. Repeat steps 2 𝑀 times. 
4. Let and be the corresponding optimal objective values and 
vectors of selected facilities, respectively. 
5. Calculate the average of all the solutions (lower bound) and their variance for equation (28) 
given equation (44) and equation (45). Compute the quality of estimated lower bound by 
following (46) and using equation (47).  
6. Compute the upper bound by solving equation (28) using Gurobi. Let the corresponding 
objective value be given by where .  
7. Compare lower bound and upper bound estimates by calculating the gap ( ). If 
the bound gap is small enough, stop. Otherwise, increase 𝑁 and go to 1.  
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All of our computational experiments are based on the data that was generated 
from the procedure presented in Section 3.4. We considered ten data instances for a 
supply chain network consisting of ten facilities and ten consumers and we select 0.75 
for the risk-level α. Table 4-7 reports the average of the optimal value/ best solution 
found from Gurobi for each data instances. As per the results obtained, none of the ten 
data instances resulted in an optimal solution within the prescribed time limit of 
14400 seconds. We consider the average of ten data instances as the upper bound and 
we consider 14210174 as Nw   in our computation. 
Table 4-7 Results obtained from AMPL for ten facilities and ten customers 
Data 
Instance no. 
best solution 
found (upper bound) 
1 16709100* 
2 14934928* 
3 12993917* 
4 15981710* 
5 13799333* 
6 12847419* 
7 14348449* 
8 15010500* 
9 11525948* 
10 13950441* 
Average 14210174 
*: Best objective values found 
Table 4-8 summarizes corresponding computational results of the modified-
SAA algorithm in detail. Note that the presented results are the average of ten data 
instances. The first and second columns present the number of replications and the 
sample size, respectively. The third column provides the estimated objective value of 
the corresponding problem. The fourth and fifth columns represent the gap between 
the best solution found by modified-SAA algorithm and the estimated objective value, 
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and the standard deviations of the estimator 
Nw , respectively. The CPU time, the 
average optimality gap (average gap between the lower bound and the upper bound) 
and finally the 95% confidence interval for the optimality gap display in the sixth, 
seventh and eighth columns, correspondingly.  It is clear from Table 4-8 that the 
solution quality can be improved by increasing the sample size however, we observe 
that average optimality gap remains above 0.50 even if we increase the sample size N. 
That is because in the set of scenarios we have some scenarios with very small 
probability values. Hence, these values result in small objective value. As a result, in 
this research we also implemented the general SAA algorithm to compare the results 
of these two algorithms. The results are presented in Table 4-9. 
Table 4-8 Computational results of modified-SAA algorithm 
| | | | Nw  %  *Nw w x  ˆ Nw  Time (s) 
% Avg. 
optimality gap 
Avg. CI of LB at 95% 
128 8 395388 0.93 36173 58 0.96 (390056, 400718) 
64 16 795,204 0.83 48225 190 0.92 (794000,  796409) 
32 32 2485926 0.71 121609 832 0.82 (2479102 , 2492750) 
16 64 3309112 0.49 296420 1301 0.76  (3022096, 3340950) 
 
The computational results in Table 4-9 indicate that the general SAA 
algorithm leads to a considerably lower average optimality gap compared to the 
modified-SAA algorithm. We also observe that, in the general SAA algorithm the 
quality gap (  *Nw w x ) and the computational time are notably smaller than the values 
achieved in Table 4-8 for modified-SAA algorithm.    
To summarize the results of this section, the general SAA leads to a better gap 
for the SCD-CVaR model with a shorter computational time compared to the 
modified-SAA algorithm. However, these solutions differed from the exact solutions 
obtained by Gurobi for the first-stage decision variable. Based on our computational 
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experiences, the modified-SAA algorithm resulted in solutions that better matched the 
first-stage decision variables from the exact solution in spite of the worse lower 
bound. For larger instances however, the solution times exceeded 2 hours of 
computations i.e., solution times are remarkably longer as problem size increases. 
Table 4-9 Computational results of general SAA algorithm 
| | | | Nw  %  *Nw w x  ˆ Nw  Time (s) 
% Avg. 
optimality gap 
Avg. CI of LB at 95% 
10 20 10002040 0.017 71056 1.9 0.30 (9943880 , 10060320) 
10 30 10133810 0.016 66349 5.0 0.28 (10078770, 10187070) 
10 50 10343740 0.016 60788 28.7 0.27 (10294310, 10393170) 
10 100 10563830 0.015 67567 231.2 0.25 (10512490, 10615160) 
10 300 10770100 0.011 54922 4794.6 0.22 (10727620, 10812690) 
4.5. Conclusions and Future Research 
In this chapter, we presented a supply network design problem with 
application in the pharmaceutical industry to hedge against unreliability of capacity 
and prevent shipping of tainted materials to the consumers. We studied a risk-neutral 
decision-making policy and a risk-averse decision-making policy. We characterized 
the trade-off between the risk and cost, which provides several insights on the impact 
of risk-aversion on the facilities’ optimal decisions in a pharmaceutical supply chain. 
Our studies demonstrated how strategic and tactical decisions change with respect to 
the risk level. We found that an increase in the risk level   leads to the selection of 
not only more reliable facilities but also a different number of facilities. The risk-
averse policy also resulted in fewer worst-case scenarios as compared to the risk-
neutral policy. Our computations also revealed that becoming more risk-averse 
resulted in remarkable increases in the cost of shipping untainted products to 
consumers.  
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Our experience from solving the problem using AMPL-Gurobi indicated that 
the number of facilities considerably increases the computational time. As a result, we 
developed a metaheuristic approach to effectively solve the presented model. We 
observed that the SA algorithm provides solutions within 5% of the solutions found 
by Gurobi for both small-size and large-size problems. We also applied the SAA 
algorithm to obtain a good lower bound for SCD-CVaR problem and also solutions to 
the first-stage problem. We considered two approaches for our SAA algorithm. In the 
first approach, we modified SAA algorithm in order to be able to use the set of 
scenarios based on our procedure we developed in this research. For the second 
approach, we considered the general SAA algorithm. Our results indicated that the 
general SAA led to a lower average optimality gap with a shorter computational time 
compared to the modified-SAA algorithm. However, based on our computational 
experiences, the modified-SAA algorithm resulted in better solutions for the first-
stage decision variables. For larger instances however, the solution times exceeded 2 
hours of computations, i.e., solution times are remarkably longer as problem size 
increases. As a future extension, we wish to investigate some techniques such as 
Bender Decomposition or L-shaped methods to efficiently solve the problems. 
The significance of this chapter is two-fold. First of all, to the best of our 
knowledge there is no currently available research to evaluate pharmaceutical (or 
healthcare) supply chain network design with respect to sending tainted materials to 
the consumer. Secondly, there is also little prior research to date that investigates 
supply chain risk within the context of the pharmaceutical supply chain. As 
pharmaceutical availability and drug safety clearly are key components to effective 
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patient quality of care, our models can assist supply chain designers enhance patient 
safety and quality of patient care.  
There are some interesting future research extensions. An extension of the 
presented work is to include demand uncertainty and/or seasonal demand. Moreover, 
we assumed an inspection and discard approach, which is not a valid assumption in 
some supply chains like the automotive and electronics industries. This assumption 
can be shifted to an inspection and fix (rework) approach where defective products 
can be repaired after detection. Ultimately, we have considered instances that 
included five facilities. However, experience from solving the models using 
commercial software indicated that the number of facilities can dramatically increase 
the computational time. We also think it is important to design and develop heuristic 
techniques to obtain acceptable solutions to these larger size problems in reasonable 
runtimes and with good solution quality. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. An Statistical Analysis of Facility Selection Process 
5.1. Statistical Analyses Motivation 
In this chapter, we will consider statistical analyses for the SCD and SCD-
CVaR models. In review of our computational analysis, we found that the selection of 
some of facilities were obvious based on parameter values such as capacity or fixed 
cost. In other cases, the facilities which appeared to be desirable were not selected. 
Hence, it may be difficult to predict or determine which facilities are selected or 
unselected; it may also be difficult to interpret the output of the SCD or SCD-CVaR 
models. We perform a regression analysis in order to identify factors for predicting 
the selection of a facility in the SCD and SCD-CVaR frameworks at various risk 
levels and to analyze relationships among variables. The second purpose for 
conducting a regression analysis in this context is to assess the probability of selection 
for each individual facility at various risk levels ( ). We will also determine the 
probability of selection for a set of selected facilities or alternatives. 
Let us consider a supply chain network consisting of five facilities and five 
consumers where the total demand of the consumers is 908 units. The values of the 
parameters for this example are presented in Table 5-1. 
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Table 5-1 Values for an example of a supply chain network 
Facility 
# 
Fixed cost (  ) 
Inspection 
cost (  ) 
Fraction of 
tainted items 
before 
inspection (  ) 
Fraction of 
remained tainted 
items after 
inspection (  ) 
Reliability 
(
l ) 
Capacity 
(  ) 
Ratio 
capacity/total 
demand 
1 
1068072 90025 0.28 0.08 90% 136 15% 
2 
1764329 77067 0.25 0.07 52% 359 40% 
3 
1565588 53977 0.17 0.08 89% 317 35% 
4 
1358214 95728 0.26 0.03 73% 247 27% 
5 
1302468 61519 0.12 0.02 85% 176 19% 
From Table 5-1, we observe the following relations  
  >   >   >   >  1 
  >  1 >   >   >   . 
Figure 5-1 illustrates this tradeoff between 
l and lq  for various values of   which is 
the result of an optimal solution. For the SCD and 
0.50
SCD-CVaR
  
models, we expect 
either a smaller number of selected facilities or facilities with lower fixed cost. As we 
observe in Figure 5-1, for SCD and 0.50SCD-CVaR , facility 1 and facility 5 are not 
selected which are facilities with the lowest fixed cost, respectively. However, as we 
observe in Table 5-1, facility 1 and facility 5 are the facilities with the highest and 
lowest fraction of tainted products before inspection, respectively. Facility 1 and 
Facility 5 also have the lowest capacity among all facilities. That indicates that in 
SCD and 0.50SCD-CVaR  model, the selection of facilities was a trade-off between 
fixed cost or capacity and fraction of tainted products.  
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In 0.65SCD-CVaR , 0.75
SCD-CVaR  and 0.85SCD-CVaR , facility 4 is not selected 
which is the most expensive facility for performing inspections. In 0.95SCD-CVaR  
and 
0.99SCD-CVaR , decision making is based on a highly risk-averse policy and almost no 
risk is acceptable. Therefore, the model mainly focuses on minimizing 5% and 1% of 
the worst outcomes and shipping the least amount of tainted items to consumers, 
respectively. However, it is unclear why Facility 5 (which is the facility with highest 
fraction of untainted products before inspection) is not selected. Consequently, 
another method should be considered to predict the selection of facilities based on 
reliability or other factors. Moreover, when moving from a risk-neutral to a risk-
averse policy, fixed costs, capacity, or  perhaps other factors may not be sufficient in 
predicting which facilities will be selected or unselected.  In the next section, a 
regression analysis is conducted. 
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Figure 5-1 Tradeoff of capacity vs. fraction of tainted products (at various risk-levels) 
5.2. Logistic Regression Analysis 
The response variable, selecting a facility, is dichotomous or binary. A linear 
regression model is inappropriate to predict a binary response variable for the 
following reasons: 
 A linear regression analysis assumes a continuous response which is 
unconstrained and can vary over the range of −  to +  whereas for 
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dichotomous variables, the observed outcome is bounded and binary, with 
only two as possible values.  
 The error terms produced from such a model will not be normally distributed.  
A logistic regression models the relationship between a two-level categorical response 
variable (binary response) and a set of explanatory (independent/predictor) variables 
which can be quantitative or qualitative. Assume we have observed independent 
variables  1,   , …,    on a group of subjects. We wish to use this information to 
describe the probability that a facility will be selected given the values of the k 
independent variables  1,   , … ,   . For notational convenience, we denote the 
probability statement 1 2( 1| , ,..., )KP y X X X as simply  X . The status of a facility,   , is 
a binary response variable coded as 1y  or 0y  with respective probability 
  1 2( 1| , ,..., )l KX P y X X X    and   1 21 1 ( 1| , ,..., ).l KX P y X X X     
The probability of 
selecting a facility is described by following relationship 
 
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
...
1 2 ...
( 1| , ,..., ) .
1
k k
k k
o X X X
l K o X X X
P y X X X e
e
   
   
   
   
 

                                                 (49) 
The terms    ,  1, …, and    in this model represent unknown parameters and must be 
estimated based on data obtained on the values of the predictor and response variables 
for a group of subjects. By rearranging equation  (49) the odds of selecting a facility 
can be expressed as: 
 
 
 
1 1 2 2 ... .
1
k ko X X X
X
X
e
   

   


                                                                                (50) 
Therefore, 
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 
  1 1 2 2
ln ... .
1
k k
X
Y o X X X
X

    

 
         
                                            (51) 
This transformation  , in equation (51), is called the logit transformation. This also 
turns equation (49) into a linear regression model. Note that 
 
 
ln
1
X
X


 
   
is the log 
odds.  
The odds are another way to express the likelihood that an event will occur. 
The odds is a ratio of the probability that some event will occur over the probability 
that it will not occur. For instance, if       is the probability of selecting a facility 
(e.g., 1y  ), then 1 −       which is the probability of that facility not being 
selected. Therefore, the odds        ⁄    which indicates that the likelihood that this 
facility is selected is four times the likelihood of this facility is not being selected. The 
advantage with using the odds is that, unlike a probability value, odds have no upper 
bound. Therefore, a small change in a probability value results in large change in 
odds. A value of one for odds indicates that the probability of selection and 
probability of not selecting a facility are the same. Our interest is in the change of the 
dependent variable for a one unit change in the independent variables, or the “Odds 
Ratio (OR).” The OR is the ratio of the odds of the event for one value of one 
independent variable (e.g., capacity) divided by the odds for a different value of that 
independent variable (for instance, a value one unit lower for capacity when other 
variables are constant in the model). Hence, the OR indicates the amount of change in 
the odds and the direction of the relationship between an independent variable and 
dependent variable.  
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In general, we can state that an OR of one indicates that the odds of selecting a 
facility are the same; an OR greater than one indicates that the odds of selecting a 
facility increases (a positive relationship); and an OR less than one indicates that the 
odds of selecting a facility decreases (a negative relationship). Table 5-2 gives a 
comparison of the standard linear regression model with the logistic regression model. 
Table 5-2 Comparison of linear and logistic regression models 
 Linear regression Logistic regression 
Model     +  1 1 +  +          𝑡      +  1 1 +  +      
Response  Continuous variable Binary variable 
Covariates Continuous or discrete Continuous or discrete 
Meaning of 
coefficient 
Amount of expected 
change in the response y 
per unit change in covariates 
Amount of change of log 
odds per unit change in the covariates 
Let ˆl  and ˆ  denote the fitted value for facility   and the corresponding estimated 
coefficients, respectively. We can rewrite the estimated odds equation as: 
 ̂   
(1− ̂   )
   ̂ + ̂   + ̂   + + ̂     
or, 
 
 
  1 1 2 2
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ln ... .
ˆ1
k k
X
Y o X X X
X

    

 
         
                                            (52) 
 Thus, given the above equation for each one unit increase in    while keeping other 
predictors constant, the predicted odds is increased by a factor of    ( ̂ ). In other 
words,    ( ̂ ) is an odds ratio, which denotes the odds at   + 1 divided by the 
odds   . Similarly, if all predictors are set equal to 0, the predicted odds is    ( ̂ ). 
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We will also consider the interaction between the variables. If two 
independent variables interact, then the effect of one of them on the dependent 
variable varies depending on the value of the other independent variable. The 
presence of interactions can have important effects for the interpretation of regression 
model. Interaction is assessed by adding the cross-product term (e.g.,  1    ) to the 
model. For instance, by assuming an interaction between    −1 and    we can rewrite 
equation (52) as following: 
 
 
  1 1 2 2 1 1
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ln ... .
ˆ1
k k k k k
X
Y o X X X X X
X

     

 
 
          
                      (53) 
Now, for each one unit increase in   , the increase in the predicted odds is a factor of 
   ( ̂ +  ̂ +1  −1). That is, an independent variable whose effect on the dependent 
variable is considered to vary as a function of the   −1. Note that an increase in the 
logit is in favor of the probability of selecting a facility since by increasing 
 ̂   
1− ̂   
, 
 ̂    would also increase. 
5.2.1. Description of the Data Source  
In this section, we define a set of continuous predictor variables that are 
hypothesized to be associated with the dependent variable, which is the status of a 
facility being selected or unselected. The predictors for facility l include the 
following: the reliability of the facility ( l ), the fixed cost of opening the facility ( lf
), the capacity of the facility ( l ), the fixed cost of implementing an inspection at the 
facility ( ln ), the total demand of the consumers ( c
c C
b b

 ), the fraction of tainted 
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products at the facility l ( lsq ); the fraction of tainted products at facility l after 
inspection (
lsr ); and risk level ( ). We will investigate the impact of these factors on 
the status of a facility. The status of a facility is represented by an indicator variable 
defined as follows:  
1, if facility  is selected,
0, else .
l
l l L
y

 

 
We use 50 data files for a specific case containing five facilities and five 
consumers. We consider seven levels for  : 0, 0.50, 0.65, 0.75, 0.85, 0.95 and 0.99. 
Therefore, in total we will have 1750 (50*5*7) observations. To ensure that the data 
generated are uniformly spread out over the defined ranges (defined in 3.4); we 
consider the histogram for each single factor in Figure 5-2.  
 
Figure 5-2 Histogram of each variable 
Given the histograms in Figure 5-2, we observe that data is distributed nearly 
uniformly over the variable ranges. We also consider a similar histogram for each 
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single facility to verify that each individual facility also has data over the predefined 
ranges. As an example, histograms for facility 1 are presented in Figure 5-3.  
 
Figure 5-3 Histogram of the data for Facility 1 
Strong linear relationships among predictor variables might imply 
multicollinearity and cause imprecise regression coefficients that are difficult to 
interpret. The relationship between two quantitative variables may be displayed 
graphically by means of a scatterplot. The scatter plots between pairs of predictor 
variables are illustrated in Figure 5-4. 
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Figure 5-4 Scatter plot of the selected variables 
A positive linear relationship between the two quantitative predictor variables 
is indicated on a scatterplot by an upward linear trend whereas a negative linear 
relationship is indicated by the opposite effect. Otherwise, if the points do not show a 
linear trend, multicollinearity should not be an issue. When we inspect the plots in 
Figure 5-4, it becomes apparent that a positive association between capacity and fixed 
cost (correlation = 0.70) and   and inspection cost (correlation =0.73) exist. This 
association may be due to the assumption that we considered during generating the 
data. One way to overcome this issue is to exclude one of the variables from the 
model. Combining two or multiple variables into a single variable may be another 
alternative. Hence, we exclude fixed cost (  ) and we define a function for the 
relationship between capacity and total demand of consumers (∑    ∈ ) which is 
105 
 
define as 
,1
l
l
c
c C
b


 

. This ratio implies the fraction of the total demand that can be 
covered by a facility. In addition, we exclude inspection cost and consider
 ,2 1l l lq r    . This fraction indicates the maximum percent of untainted products 
that we can expect from facility l after performing an inspection. Therefore, we 
consider risk-level ( ), reliability of facility l ( l ), the fraction of the total demand 
that can be covered by facility l (
,1l ), and the maximum percent of untainted 
products that we can expect from facility l after performing an inspection (
,2l ) as our 
independent variables in the statistical analyses. In the next section, we discuss our 
regression model. 
5.2.2. Model Description 
The main analysis of this section uses a logistic regression model to consider 
the relationship of the independent variables with the dependent variable. The first 
order logistic regression model is presented as follows: 
 
0 1 2 3 ,1 4 ,2
0 1 2 3 ,1 4 ,2
,1 ,2( 1| , , , )
1
l l l
l l l
l l l lP y
e
e
     
     

      
      
    

                                             (54) 
and given (51) 
  0 1 2 3 ,1 4 ,2ln .l l l lY odds                                                                 (55) 
And given the equation (55), the mean response function for the log odds is written as 
  0 1 2 3 1 4 2.lE Y                                                                                  (56) 
The regression model with interaction is as follows: 
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0 1 2 3 ,1 4 ,2 5 6 ,1 7 ,2
8 ,1 9 ,2 10 ,1 ,2 .
l l l l l l l
l l l l l l
Y            
   
             
         
                            (57) 
The mean response function for equation (57) can be written as follows: 
  0 1 2 3 1 4 2 5 6 1 7 2
8 1 9 2 10 1 2.
lE Y            
  
           
      
                               (58) 
We consider two approaches for our statistical analysis. In the first approach, 
as we assumed in Section 3.4, we assume the cost of selecting a facility is correlated 
with the capacity such that the facility with the highest capacity has the highest fixed 
cost of selection. In the second approach, however, we assume that cost of selecting a 
facility is correlated with the reliability of a facility or the probability of facility being 
in state 0 ( l ). The statistical analysis in this research was executed in the software 
package R (64-bit) version 2.11.1. 
5.2.2.1. Approach 1 
The coefficients from the estimated regression model for the first approach, 
when we assume the cost of selecting a facility is correlated with the capacity are 
given in Table 5-3. In Table 5-3, the coefficients, their standard errors, Wald test 
statistic, and the associated p-values are given. In logistic regression, the significance 
of a predictor variable is assessed via the likelihood ratio Chi-square test or Wald test 
[86]. At any step in the procedure, the variable with the smallest p-value is the one 
that produces the greatest change in the log-likelihood relative to a model not 
containing the variable. The Wald test statistic is computed by dividing the estimated 
coefficient of interest by its standard error (𝑆 ( ̂)   𝑎 ( ̂)
1
 ⁄  where  ̂  is the 
estimated coefficient). For instance, from Table 5-3 we observe that the regression 
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coefficient for   is significant at 0.05 level and 1  is significant at 0.01 level whereas 
2  is not significant in this approach. Table 5-3 also indicates that interaction between 
  and 1  , and the interaction between 1 and 2  are highly significant at 0.001 level. 
Given Table 5-3, we have 
  1 2 1
2 1 2 1 2
ˆ ln 5.53 8.41 6.10 60.20 11.81 1.53 20.22
2.46 6.77 5.15 99.26
lY odds   

          
        
      
(59) 
Table 5-3 Logistic regression model result for approach 1 
Research Model 
Predictors 
Logistic 
Coefficients 
Std. Error 
z value 
(significance level) 
Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 5.35 8.06 0.66 0.51 
  -8.41 4.01 -2.09* 0.03 
  6.10 9.09 0.67 0.50 
 1 -60.41 19.23 -3.14
** 0.00 
   -11.81 9.97 -1.19 0.24 
   1.53 2.36 0.65 0.52 
  1 20.22 4.10 4.93
*** 0.00 
    2.46 4.40 0.56 0.58 
  1 -6.77 14.18 -0.48 0.63 
    -5.15 9.77 -0.53 0.60 
 1   99.26 27.81 3.57
*** 0.00 
Significant codes:  ‘***’ <     1; ‘**’ <    1; ‘*’  <    5; ‘.’ <   1; ‘’ 1, AIC = 925.0 
5.2.2.1.1. Approach 1 Interpretation 
As stated, when a model has interaction between variables, it attempts to 
describe how the outcome for an independent variable is different depending on the 
level of another independent variable. We present an example of how to interpret the 
fitted model here to clarify the interaction interpretation in our regression model. 
From Equation (59), it can be shown that the change in the logit (or log odds) with 
0.25 unit increase in   when other variables are held constant is 
108 
 
0.25
, 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ 2.01 0.38 5.05 0.61 .l l lY Y Y
 


                                                       (60)
Equation (60) indicates that when a model has interaction term(s) of two independent 
variables, the effect of one independent variable on the dependent variable varies 
depending on the value of the other independent variable. Let’s assume the reliability 
of a facility is 50 percent (      ), the facility can cover 15 percent of the demand 
or 1 0.15   and we expect a maximum of 70 percent untainted products from facility 
(i.e., 2 0.70  ) when 0.50  . From equation (60) we observe that increasing   to 
0.75 will result in changing the odds of the selecting the facility by approximately a 
factor of 0.53. On the other hand, by considering a higher value for 2 , say 0.75 
(which means reducing the fraction of expected tainted product), and keeping 1  at 
the same level, we will observe approximately 3 percent increase in odds of selecting 
the facility. By holding 2  at 0.70 and increasing 1  to 0.16, a 5% increase is 
observed which indicates an increase in the likelihood of selecting larger facilities for 
higher values of confidence level.   
5.2.2.2. Approach 2 
 The coefficients from the estimated regression model for approach 2 are given in 
Table 5-4. From Table 5-4 we observe that, the regression coefficient for   is highly 
significant at 0.001 level while in approach 1 this value is significant at 0.05 level. 
Furthermore, 2  
is significant at 0.01 level whereas this ratio itself was not significant 
in approach 1. From Table 5-4 we also observe that unlike approach 1,   and    are 
significant at 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. Interaction between   and 2  is 
significant at 0.1 level. Given Table 5-4,  
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  1 2 1
2 1 2 1 2
ˆ ln 48.73 20.12 28.39 77.950 50.62 8.96 12.03
12.24 14.52 15.32 111.15 .
lY odds   

          
        
(61) 
Table 5-4 Logistic regression model result for approach 2 
Research Model 
Predictors 
Logistic 
Coefficients 
Std. Error 
z value 
(significance 
level) 
Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 48.73 12.38 3.94*** 0.00008 
  -20.12 5.25 -3.84*** 0.00013 
  -28.39 14.30 -1.99* 0.04704 
 1 -77.95 42.70 -1.83
. 0.06790 
   -50.62 17.85 -2.84
** 0.00458 
   8.96 3.14 2.86** 0.00430 
  1 12.03 8.53 1.41 0.15843 
    12.24 6.85 1.79
. 0.07384 
  1 14.52 27.23 0.53 0.59370 
    15.32 13.62 1.13 0.26045 
 1   111.15 63.26 1.76
. 0.07890 
Significant codes:  ‘***’ <     1; ‘**’ <    1; ‘*’  <    5; ‘.’ <   1; ‘’ 1, AIC = 999.15 
5.2.2.2.1. Approach 2 Interpretation 
From equation (61), the change in the log odds with 0.25 unit increase in   
when other variables are held constant is 
0.25
, 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ 5.03 2.24 3.01 3.06 .l l lY Y Y
 


                                                       (62) 
Given       , 1 0.15   
and 2 0.70  , the change in the odds of the selecting the 
facility will be a factor of 0.26. If we increase    to        the increase in odds of 
the selecting the facility of will be 0.23 percent which indicates increasing the 
reliability of a facility will result in increasing the likelihood of selecting the facility. 
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5.2.3. Stepwise Regression  
From Table 5-3 and Table 5-4, it is observable that not all coefficients are 
significant. For instance, the coefficient for the interaction between   and 2  is not a 
significant predictor in approach 1. We therefore apply a stepwise selection procedure 
to obtain only the variables are significant predictors for status. The stepwise logistic 
regression (SLR) method allows the model to be assessed as it is being built. In the 
SLR, predictor variables are selected for inclusion or exclusion from the regression 
model based on a stepwise selected method.  
Stepwise regression method is a combination of the forward selection and 
backward elimination, testing at each iteration for variables to be included or 
excluded. Forward selection starts with no variables and selects variables if they are 
statistically significant. Backward elimination starts with all candidate variables, 
examining them one by one for statistical significance, and finally, eliminating the 
ones that are not significant. The R software package has an option that allows the 
user to perform the stepwise procedure.  
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) approach is used to obtain the log-
likelihood value. At any step in the procedure, a statistically significant variable is the 
one that produces the greatest change in the log-likelihood relative to a model not 
containing the variable [93]. The AIC is based on a likelihood theory and is a function 
of the number of observations  , the sum of squared errors SSE and the number of 
parameters estimated in the model  , as shown in the following: 
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AIC ln 2
SSE
n p
n
 
  
 
. 
The first term in the above equation is a measure of the model lack of fit while the 
second term is a penalty term for additional parameters in the model. Therefore, as the 
number of parameters   included in the model increases, the lack of fit term should 
decrease due to the decrease of the error while the penalty term increases. On the 
other hand, as variables are dropped from the model, the lack of fit term should 
increase while the penalty term decreases.  The model with the smallest AIC is 
considered the best model since it minimizes the difference from the given model to 
the true model. The AIC after implementing the stepwise selection method for 
approach 1 is 918.9 while the calculated AIC for equation (59) was 925.0. Therefore, 
we select the model resulting from the combination model. The coefficients from the 
estimated regression model for approach 1 after performing the stepwise selection 
method are given in Table 5-5.  
Table 5-5 Logistic regression model result for approach 1 after performing SLR 
Research Model 
Predictors 
Logistic 
Coefficients 
Std. Error 
z value 
(significance level) 
Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 5.81 3.48 1.67
. 0.10 
      -2.59 0.79 -3.25** 0.00 
  1.57 0.75 2.09* 0.04 
 1  -55.99 18.08 -3.10
** 0.00 
    -12.30 4.23 -2.91
** 0.00 
  1 19.02 3.99 4.76
*** 0.00 
 1   88.79 22.22 4.00
*** 0.00 
Significant codes:  ‘***’ <     1; ‘**’ <    1; ‘*’  <    5; ‘.’ <   1; ‘’ 1, AIC = 918.87 
From Table 5-5, performing a stepwise procedure resulted in excluding a few of the 
interactions and reducing the AIC by almost seven units to 918.9. Given Table 5-5, let 
us rewrite equation (59) as follows: 
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1 2 1 1 2
ˆ 5.81 2.59 1.57 55.99 12.30 19.02 88.796 .lY                               (63) 
In the logistic regression model (63), some of the interaction term still exists. From 
equation (63), the coefficient for   is -2.59 and by increasing   by 0.25 unit, the odds 
ratio will be   −    +       . For instance, when 1 is held at 0.15,  we will have 0.06 
for the odds increase and the odds for 1 equal 0.16 will 0.31 which indicates more 
than 60 percent increase in odds of selecting the facility.  
The coefficients from the estimated regression model for approach 2 after 
performing the stepwise method are given in Table 5-6. From Table 5-6 we observe 
that performing a stepwise procedure resulted in excluding a few of the interactions 
and reducing the AIC by nearly 3 units to 996. Given Table 5-6, the regression model 
for approach 2 with interaction is as follows: 
1 2 2 1 2
ˆ 44.61 17.45 12.39 85.80 47.12 10.04 142.16 12.39 .lY               
(64) 
Table 5-6 Logistic regression model result for approach 2 after performing SLR 
Research Model 
Predictors 
Logistic Coefficients Std. Error 
z value 
(significance level) 
Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 41.66 9.25 4.50*** 0.0000 
  -17.45 4.99 -3.49*** 0.0005 
  -12.39 2.35 -5.28*** 0.0000 
 1 -85.80 32.92 -2.61
** 0.0092 
   -47.12 11.39 -4.14
*** 0.0000 
   10.04 3.06 3.29** 0.0010 
    142.16 39.44 3.61
. 0.0003 
 1   -12.39 2.35 -5.28
*** 0.0000 
Significant codes:  ‘***’ <     1; ‘**’ <    1; ‘*’  <    5; ‘.’ <   1; ‘’ 1, AIC = 996.62 
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5.2.4. Prediction  
To evaluate the predictive ability of the model based on the estimated logistic 
coefficients in Table 5-5 and Table 5-6, we perform prediction for both approach 1 
and approach 2 for a set of 5 facilities. We consider two risk-level values for all the 
facilities, i.e.,       ,     . The data and the result of prediction are presented in 
Table 5-7 and Table 5-8. Note that in approach 1 facilities are sorted based on their 
capacity and in approach 2 facilities are sorted based on their reliability.  
The results in Table 5-7 indicate that 1 is a very significant attribute when 
selecting a supplier in approach 1. For instance, the likelihood of selecting the facility 
with the highest capacity (i.e., Facility 1) is 0.607 for  =0.50 whereas this facility has 
the worst reliability among the others and only 71 percent of its capacity can be used 
after inspection. We also observe 9% growth in likelihood of selection for Facility 1 
for  =0.95. As another example, Facility 4 is the most reliable facility and provides a 
large portion of untainted products even after inspection.  However, we observe a 
small likelihood of selection since its capacity is small. The likelihood of selection 
reduces even more when   increases to 0.95.  
Table 5-7 Likelihood of selection of facilities in approach 1 
Facility 
# 
reliability  1    
 =0.50 
 
 =0.95 
Probability 
of selection 
logit 
 
Probability 
of 
selection 
logit 
2 0.7457 0.2782 0.7587 0.780 1.265 
 
0.829 1.581 
4 0.9084 0.1264 0.8992 0.425 -0.304 
 
0.397 -0.420 
3 0.8392 0.1916 0.9074 0.711 0.901 
 
0.725 0.971 
5 0.8326 0.1068 0.8324 0.276 -0.965 
 
0.243 -1.136 
1 0.5024 0.3006 0.7146 0.607 0.435 
 
0.693 0.815 
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A notable observation from Table 5-7 is that, for higher risk-level the likelihood of 
selecting a facility decreases for facilities with smaller capacities. This indicates that 
in approach 1, a risk-averse decision-maker tends to provide more capacity to hedge 
against risk.  
The results in Table 5-8, however, indicate that higher weight assigned to 
reliability of a facility in approach 2 as compared to approach 1. A notable 
observation from Table 5-8 is that Facility 5 has the lowest reliability but its capacity 
is the largest. The probability of selecting facility 5 for  =0.50 is 0.995. However, 
after increasing risk-level   to 0.95, the probability of selecting facility 5 decreases 
to 0.965. This decrease indicates that more reliable facilities are selected in risk-
averse decision making policy. These results can be useful for facilities as well since 
it enables them to analyze their situation and compare it with other facilities 
(competitors) and attempt to change their behaviors in order to increase their 
likelihood of selection. We believe that other important implications in practice can 
be achieved through this result. 
Table 5-8 Likelihood of selection of facilities in approach 2 
Facility # reliability  1    
 =0.50 
 
 =0.95 
Probability 
of selection 
logit 
 
Probability 
of 
selection 
logit 
3 0.6027 0.1098 0.8443 0.006 -5.141 
 
0.005 -5.279 
4 0.5624 0.2045 0.7535 0.408 -0.371 
 
0.341 -0.643 
1 0.8701 0.1277 0.8068 0.044 -3.068 
 
0.102 -2.725 
2 0.8385 0.2915 0.7989 0.809 1.895 
 
0.866 2.053 
5 0.5563 0.3501 0.7167 0.995 5.254 
 
0.965 3.915 
5.2.5. Key Observations 
Recall that in approach 1 we assumed that the cost of selecting a facility is 
correlated with the capacity such that the facility with the highest capacity has the 
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highest fixed cost of selection. In approach 2, however, we assume that cost of 
selecting a facility is correlated with the reliability of a facility or the probability of 
facility being in state 0. We summarize our observations from approach 1 and 
approach 2 and also risk-neutral and risk-averse decision making policies as 
following: 
 Facilities with larger capacities have higher likelihood of selection when 
capacity drives facility cost. 
 When capacity drives facility cost, for higher value of   (risk-averse policy) 
the likelihood of selection goes down if capacity of facility goes down. 
 When reliability drives facility cost, increasing the reliability of a facility will 
result in increasing the likelihood of selecting the facility. 
 When reliability drives facility cost, for higher value of risk-level   the 
likelihood of selection goes down if reliability and/or the fraction untainted 
products that we can expect from facility l after performing an inspection go 
down. 
 Provided that the problem is capacitated (i.e., the capacity is limited), “size” of 
the facility is perceived to be the most important factor for facility selection in 
the risk-neutral and risk-averse policies and also when capacity drives facility 
cost and when reliability drives facility cost. 
 Under the risk-neutral policy, “reliability” of the facility is perceived to be the 
least important factor. 
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5.3. Multinomial Logistic Regression (MLR)  
In Section 5.2, we conducted a logistic regression analysis to assess the 
likelihood of selection for each individual facility at various risk levels. In this 
section, we assess the likelihood of selection for a set of selected facilities at various 
risk levels. For instance, we assess the likelihood of selecting all the facilities together 
or selecting all the facilities except Facility 1. 
Suppose the set of selected facilities,  , is a categorical response variable with 
J categories. Let  1 2, ,..., J   be the response probabilities satisfying 1JJ  . 
When one takes n independent observations, the probability distribution for the 
number of outcomes that occur within each of the J types is a multinomial distribution 
[94]. One value (typically the first, the last, or the value with the highest frequency) of 
the dependent variable is designated as the reference or baseline category. The 
probability of the other categories is compared to the probability of the reference 
category. For instance, if there are four categories (alternatives), A, B, C, and D, and 
the reference category is A, MLR will calculate the log odds (or estimates the set of 
coefficients) for being in category B versus A, category C versus A, and category D 
versus A. Each set of coefficients then represents the effect of a unit change in the 
independent variables on the log odds of each category relative to the reference 
category.  
For a dependent variable Y with J categories, we require the calculation of J-1 
log odds, one for each category relative to the reference category, to describe the 
relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables. As a 
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result, if the last category is the reference, then, for j = 1,…, J-1, the odds ratio of 
category j with predictor x is 
 log , 1,..., 1.
j
j j
J
x j J

 

 
    
 
                                                                         (65) 
The choice probability for the reference category J is 
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The response probabilities for 1,..., 1j J  can be expressed as 
 
1
1
.
1
j j
j j j
x
j J
x
j
e
e
 
 







                                                                                                  (67) 
5.3.1. Description of the Data Source  
We consider risk-level ( ), the fraction of the total demand that can be 
covered by facility l (
,1l ) and the maximum percent of untainted products that we 
can expect from facility l after performing inspection (
,2l ) as our independent 
variables. In the next section, we discuss our regression model. We use 120 data 
instances for a specific case containing five facilities and five consumers. Hence, we 
have 2 1
L
  possible sets of alternatives of selected facilities as illustrated within 
Table (c) in Appendix C. For instance, in Table (c) alternative “ee” indicates the 
alternative that all facilities are not selected except Facility 1 and alternative “a” is the 
alternative that all facilities are selected. We consider seven levels for the risk level  : 
0, 0.50, 0.65, 0.75, 0.85, 0.95 and 0.99. As a result, in total we will have 840 (120*7) 
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observations. Finally, for the sake of interpretability, we sort the reliability and 
consequently 
,2l  in a descending manner so that Facility 1 is the most reliable facility 
and Facility 5 is the least reliable facility. Moreover, as mentioned, strong linear 
relationships among predictor variables might imply multicollinearity and cause 
imprecise regression coefficients that are difficult to interpret. The relationship 
between the independent variables is illustrated in Figure 5-5. By inspecting Figure 
5-5, it becomes apparent that a positive linear association between some of the 
independent variables exists. For instance, a positive linear association between 
3,2
and 
4,2  (correlation = 0.74), 1,2  
and 
2,2  (correlation = 0.62), and 1,1  
and 
3,1  
(correlation = -0.43) exists. To overcome this issue, we convert 
,2l from a 
quantitative variable to a qualitative variable with three levels e.g., ‘‘1 = High 
expectation” where  ,2 0.86,0.94 ,l  ‘‘2 = Medium expectation” where 
 ,2 0.78,0.86l  , and finally, ‘‘3 = Low expectation” where  ,2 0.70,0.78l  . We 
also exclude 
3,1  from the model. 
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Figure 5-5 Scatter plot of the selected MLR variables 
 
5.3.2. Model Description 
In our MLR model, the two-way interaction effects of the independent 
variables are also considered. As an example, the coefficients from the estimated 
results of multinomial logistic regression model ( 0.75  ) are given in Table 5-9. 
Note that in Table 5-9, alternative “b” (which is the alternative that all facilities are 
selected except the most reliable, i.e., Facility 1) is the reference category and the 
probability of categories is compared to the probability of the reference category.  
Hence, given Table 5-9 and equation (65) the log odds of the estimated MLR model 
for alternative “c” (the alternative that all facilities are selected except the most 
reliable i.e., Facility 2) is 
1,1 2,1 4,1 5,1 1,2 2,2
3,2 5,2
log -39.917 33.024 -52.932 -33.941 -30.185 -2.9763 -0.39135
0.77611 +22.184 .
c
b


 
        
 
 
                                                                         (68)  
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Table 5-9 Multinomial regression model result for        
Research Model Predictors Multinomial Coefficients Std. Error t-value (significance level) Pr(>|t|) 
altc -39.917 91761 -0.0004 1.000 
alte -108.37 97011 -0.0011 0.999 
alti 12.194 13.27 0.9189 0.358 
altk 112.24 68579 0.0016 0.999 
altq 12.708 12.075 1.0525 0.293 
alty -29.662 93273 -0.0003 1.000 
altc:ratio1.1 33.024 18.848 1.7521 0.080. 
alte:ratio1.1 83.312 21.476 3.8793 0.000*** 
alti:ratio1.1 41.676 18.887 2.2065 0.027* 
altk:ratio1.1 196.82 41190 0.0048 0.996 
altq:ratio1.1 38.122 18.188 2.096 0.036* 
alty:ratio1.1 248.92 158690 0.0016 0.999 
altc:ratio1.2 -52.932 19.467 -2.719 0.007*** 
alte:ratio1.2 40.735 18.386 2.2156 0.027* 
alti:ratio1.2 -9.789 16.319 -0.5999 0.549 
altk:ratio1.2 -496.77 129650 -0.0038 0.997 
altq:ratio1.2 0.72686 15.197 0.0478 0.962 
alty:ratio1.2 160.25 91802 0.0017 0.999 
altc:ratio1.4 -33.941 18.119 -1.8732 0.061. 
alte:ratio1.4 18.031 19.3 0.9343 0.350 
alti:ratio1.4 -32.748 17.018 -1.9243 0.054. 
altk:ratio1.4 -344.04 76278 -0.0045 0.996 
altq:ratio1.4 -37.84 16.147 -2.3435 0.019* 
alty:ratio1.4 -221.36 76698 -0.0029 0.998 
altc:ratio1.5 -30.185 18.861 -1.6004 0.110 
alte:ratio1.5 35.907 22.438 1.6003 0.110 
alti:ratio1.5 -17.671 18.982 -0.9309 0.352 
altk:ratio1.5 -311.28 85893 -0.0036 0.997 
altq:ratio1.5 -39.092 18.02 -2.1694 0.030* 
alty:ratio1.5 -263.6 140030 -0.0019 0.998 
altc:ratio2.1 -2.9763 2.7625 -1.0774 0.281 
alte:ratio2.1 -1.7366 2.2707 -0.7648 0.444 
alti:ratio2.1 -2.7198 2.1427 -1.2694 0.204 
altk:ratio2.1 29.213 25202 0.0012 0.999 
altq:ratio2.1 -2.7911 2.0057 -1.3916 0.164 
alty:ratio2.1 14.456 27381 0.0005 1.000 
altc:ratio2.2 -0.39135 1.9627 -0.1994 0.842 
alte:ratio2.2 -0.83265 1.657 -0.5025 0.615 
alti:ratio2.2 -0.38954 1.5294 -0.2547 0.799 
altk:ratio2.2 44.571 14191 0.0031 0.997 
altq:ratio2.2 -1.5184 1.4893 -1.0195 0.308 
alty:ratio2.2 27.466 11428 0.0024 0.998 
altc:ratio2.3 0.77611 2.1987 0.353 0.724 
alte:ratio2.3 -0.8342 1.9577 -0.4261 0.670 
alti:ratio2.3 -1.5974 1.9132 -0.8349 0.404 
altk:ratio2.3 -33.976 17309 -0.002 0.998 
altq:ratio2.3 -0.80602 1.8586 -0.4337 0.665 
alty:ratio2.3 -8.3163 13081 -0.0006 0.999 
altc:ratio2.5 22.184 30587 0.0007 0.999 
alte:ratio2.5 22.296 32337 0.0007 0.999 
alti:ratio2.5 1.1626 2.0254 0.574 0.566 
altk:ratio2.5 13.27 15474 0.0009 0.999 
altq:ratio2.5 3.2877 2.01 1.6357 0.102 
alty:ratio2.5 -13.914 24695 -0.0006 1.000 
Significant codes:  ‘***’ <     1; ‘**’ <    1; ‘*’  <    5; ‘.’ <   1; ‘’ 1 
Log-Likelihood: -77.582 
McFadden R^2:  0.53146  
Likelihood ratio test : chisq = 176 (p.value=< 2.22e-16)  
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5.3.3. Prediction  
This section is concerned with the predictive ability of our resultant MLR 
model. The data and the result of prediction are presented in Table 5-10 and Table 
5-11, respectively. Note that we use identical data for all values of risk-level  .  
Table 5-10 Data used in prediction 
1,1  0.250 
2,1  0.223 
4,1  0.278 
5,1  0.258 
1,2  1 
2,2  2 
3,2  3 
5,2  3 
The results of prediction are summarized in Table 5-11 (and illustrated in 
Figure (e)). Several observations can be made from this table. For instance, we 
observe how the probability of alternative “a” increases with increases to  . This 
observation confirms our results in Chapter 4 where we observed that for higher 
values of risk-level, the number of selected facilities gradually increases. This 
increase can be justified because a risk-averse decision-maker provides more capacity 
(by selection of more facilities) in order to be able both to perform more inspections 
and to discard more tainted products and still satisfy the total demand. Furthermore, 
for 0.05  , there exists a (small) likelihood of selecting alternatives with a lower 
number of selected facilities (i.e., the alternatives “u” and “y”).  
Another result that we obtained in Chapter 4 was that, for higher values of  , 
a risk-averse decision-maker tends to select more reliable facilities and vice versa. For 
instance, alternative “b” is the alternative where the most reliable facility (Facility 1) 
is not selected. From Table 5-11, we observe that increasing   leads to a lower 
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likelihood of selecting this alternative which indicates that the tendency to close the 
most reliable facility decreases with respect to increasing the risk-level  . Moreover, 
Facility 5 and Facility 4 are the least reliable facility and we observe the probability of 
the alternatives “i” and “q” is larger when becoming more risk-averse. The result of 
MLR verified the result of our computational analysis in Chapter 4 where we showed 
that the risk-averse policy results in different strategic compared to the risk-neutral 
policy. 
Table 5-11 Prediction performance of MLR model 
  
Alternatives 
alpha 
Reference (baseline) 
category 
a b c e i q u y 
11111 01111 10111 11011 11101 11110 11010 11100 
0.05 b 0 0.272 0.270 0.013 0.090 0.339 0.005 0.011 
0.5 b 0 0.222 0.315 0.022 0.096 0.343 0.000 0.002 
0.65 b 0 0.038 0.481 0.002 0.076 0.403 0.000 0.000 
0.75 b 0 0.008 0.690 0.000 0.058 0.244 0.000 0.000 
0.85 a 0.0001 0.001 0.551 0.002 0.070 0.376 0.000 0.000 
0.95 a 0.245 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.043 0.540 0.000 0.000 
0.99 a 0.434 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.074 0.444 0.000 0.000 
 
5.3.4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter firstly identified the factors for predicting the 
selection of a facility in the SCD and SCD-CVaR frameworks at various risk levels 
and to analyze relationships among variables. Secondly, by conducting a logistic 
regression analysis and multinomial regression analysis we assessed the probability of 
selection for each individual facility at various risk levels along with probability of 
selection for a set of selected facilities or alternatives.  
The obtained results enable managers to identify the criteria that impact our 
strategic decisions in both the risk-neutral and risk-averse decision-making policies. 
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The results also enable the facilities to analyze their situations and compare them with 
other facilities (competitors) and to change their behaviors in order to increase their 
likelihood of selection.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. Conclusions and Future Research 
6.1. Research Conclusions 
In response to certain catastrophic events, particularly in the healthcare and 
pharmaceutical supply chains, this research focused on risks that impact strategic and 
tactical decisions in these types of supply chains. In contrast with most prior research, 
in this dissertation we focused on the supply (capacity) management required to hedge 
against the unreliability of capacity and to prevent the shipping of tainted materials to 
the consumers. 
We discussed models for designing supply chain networks resilient to capacity 
disruptions. The goal was to design a supply chain infrastructure under the risk of 
disruption, so that it operates with the highest possible efficiency (i.e., at low cost) 
both normally and when a disruption occurs. However, such network design problems 
belong to the class of NP-hard problems. Accordingly, heuristic algorithms and 
metaheuristic approaches were developed to obtain the solutions to these types of 
problems. 
In Chapter 3, we considered a single-period, single-product supply chain with 
capacitated facilities. We considered a risk-neutral decision-making policy based on a 
cost-minimization approach and utilized a mixed integer stochastic programming 
model formulated as a two-stage optimization problem. The goal of the model 
consisted of the facility selection in the first stage, defining capacity (product) 
allocation among the consumers, and inspection decisions. The objective was to 
minimize the expected cost composed of the fixed cost of selecting the facility, the 
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cost of shipping untainted products, the cost of shipping tainted products, the cost of 
inspection the facility, and the cost of discarding tainted products.  
From solving the problem in AMPL, we observed that the number of facilities, 
and consequently the number of scenarios, had a significant impact on the 
computational time of our problem. Therefore, we developed nine constructive 
heuristic methods, two improvement heuristic methods, and a Simulated Annealing 
(SA) approach to solve the presented model effectively. Based on our computational 
studies and statistical analyses, the SA approach is not efficient in terms of solution 
quality and solution time for small-sized problems or a small number of scenarios. 
However, some developed heuristics achieved good solution qualities in a more 
reasonable time compared with the optimal or best found solution. Moreover, our 
improvement heuristic algorithms were able to improve the solutions obtained from 
constructive heuristics. Therefore, constructive and improvement heuristics were 
preferable in small sized problems. However, for problems with ten or more facilities, 
the SA approach outperformed constructive and improvement heuristics even though 
it required higher computational time. 
In Chapter 4, we addressed a risk-averse decision-making policy wherein 
rather than selecting facilities and identifying the pertinent supplier-consumer 
assignments that minimize the expected cost, the decision-maker uses a CVaR 
approach to measure and quantify risk and to define what comprises a worst-case 
scenario. 
We characterized the trade-off between the risk and the cost and this provided 
several insights on the impact of risk-aversion on the optimal decisions. Our studies 
demonstrated how strategic and tactical decisions changed with respect to the risk 
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level. We found that an increase in the risk level   leads to the selection of more 
reliable facilities and a different number of facilities. The risk-averse policy also 
resulted in fewer worst-case scenarios compared with the risk-neutral policy. Our 
computations also revealed that becoming more risk-averse resulted in remarkable 
increases in the cost of shipping untainted products to consumers.  
Lastly, we considered statistical analyses for the risk-neutral and risk-averse 
decision-making policies in Chapter 5. We found that the selection of certain facilities 
was obvious based on parameter values, such as capacity or fixed cost. In other cases, 
facilities that appeared to be desirable were not selected. Hence, it may be difficult to 
predict or determine which facilities are selected or unselected; it may also be difficult 
to interpret the output of the SCD or SCD-CVaR models. Hence, we conducted a 
regression analysis to identify factors for predicting the selection of a facility at 
various risk levels and to identify relationships among independent variables. 
The result from the logistic regression analysis revealed that in the risk-averse 
policy when sufficient capacity is available, reliability ( ) and the maximum percent 
of untainted products that we can expect from a facility (
2 ) are perceived to be the 
most important factors for facility selection. Moreover, if the capacity is limited, the 
“size” of the facility, that is, the fraction of the total demand that can be covered by a 
facility (
,1l ), is perceived to be the most important factor for facility selection in 
both the risk-neutral and risk-averse policies. Under the risk-neutral decision-making 
policy, “reliability” of the facility is perceived to be the least important factor, and 
cost of selection is a significant factor.  
From the multinomial regression analysis, we observed that for higher values 
of risk-level, the number of selected facilities increased. The reason is that a risk-
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averse decision-maker provides more capacity (by selection of more facilities) to be 
able both to perform more inspections and to discard more tainted products and still 
satisfy the total demand. Another result was that the tendency toward not selecting the 
most reliable facility decreases as a decision-maker becomes more conservative. The 
outcome of our models and the statistical analysis could enable managers to select the 
most qualified suppliers for their supply chain and to make capacity allocation and 
inspection implementation decisions under both risk-neutral and risk-averse policies. 
Furthermore, results enable decision-makers to change their behaviors to increase 
their likelihood of selection. 
6.2. Future Research Directions 
The models and solution methods addressed in this dissertation can be 
extended for future research directions.  
In Chapter 3, we assumed an inspection and discard approach, which is not a 
valid assumption in certain supply chains, such as the automotive and electronics 
industries. This assumption can be shifted to an inspection and fix (rework) approach, 
where defective products can be repaired after detection. Another good extension is to 
develop other metaheuristic techniques, such as a Genetic Algorithm or a Tabu 
Search, for comparison with the SA algorithm. 
In Chapter 4, we considered instances that included five facilities. However, 
experience from solving the models using commercial software indicated that the 
number of facilities could increase the computational time dramatically. As a future 
extension, we can consider other methodologies, such as Bender’s Decomposition, 
Lagrangian relaxation, or L-shaped methods, to solve larger-sized problems. We also 
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think it is important to design and develop heuristic techniques to obtain acceptable 
solutions to these larger size problems in reasonable runtimes and with good solution 
quality. 
In our research, we considered deterministic or estimated demands and that 
might not always be a valid assumption. Hence, an interesting extension of the 
presented work is to include demand uncertainty and/or seasonal demand as they exist 
in real-world supply chains.  
The model itself can be extended by considering a multi-commodity model 
instead of a single-product model. Adding more tier levels is another possible future 
direction. For example, we could extend the model to include multiple raw material 
suppliers or multiple distribution centers. 
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APPENDIX A 
 Normal probability plots of the residuals  
 
Figure (a) Normal Probability Plot of Residuals set 0-4 (5 facility 5 customers) 
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Figure (b) Normal Probability Plot of Residuals set 5-9 (5 facility 5 customers) 
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 Figure (c) Normal Probability Plot of Residuals set 0-4 (ten facility ten customers) 
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 Figure (d) Normal Probability Plot of Residuals set 5-10 (ten facility ten customers)  
132 
 
APPENDIX B 
 Pairwise Wilcoxon test  
Table (a) R package output for Pairwise Wilcoxon Test (5 facility and 5 customers) 
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BGH&GIH 0.500 - - - - - - - - - - 
BGH&RGIH 0.491 0.492 - - - - - - - - - 
SGH&FSIH 0.000 0.000 0.000 - - - - - - - - 
SGH&GIH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.513 - - - - - - - 
SGH&RGIH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.497 0.484 - - - - - - 
CBGH&FSIH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.569 0.556 0.572 - - - - - 
CBGH&GIH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.565 0.552 0.568 0.496 - - - - 
CBGH&RGIH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.546 0.533 0.549 0.476 0.481 - - - 
Local_x 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.187 0.179 0.189 0.144 0.147 0.158 - - 
VNS_P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.110 0.106 0.112 0.081 0.083 0.080 0.367 - 
SA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.096 0.072 0.050 0.051 0.056 0.156 0.389 
Table (b) R package output for Pairwise Wilcoxon Test (ten facility and ten customers) 
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BGH&GIH 0.514 - - - - - - - - - - 
BGH&RGIH 0.440 0.426 - - - - - - - - - 
SGH&FSIH 0.000 0.000 0.000 - - - - - - - - 
SGH&GIH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.498 - - - - - - - 
SGH&RGIH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.580 0.582 - - - - - - 
CBGH&FSIH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.717 0.718 0.645 - - - - - 
CBGH&GIH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.719 0.720 0.647 0.502 - - - - 
CBGH&RGIH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.764 0.765 0.697 0.558 0.555 - - - 
Local_x 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.224 0.225 0.168 0.092 0.091 0.070 - - 
VNS_P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.115 0.116 0.081 0.039 0.038 0.028 0.329 - 
SA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0565 0.0566 0.044 0.019 0.019 0.013 0.042 0.068 
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APPENDIX C 
 Possible set of alternatives of selected facilities  
Table (c) Set of alternatives of selected facilities for 5 facilities 
# 
Set of selected facilities 
Alternative 
Facility 1-Facility 2-Facility 3-Facility 4-Facility 5 
1 11111 a 
2 01111 b 
3 10111 c 
4 00111 d 
5 11011 e 
6 01011 f 
7 10011 g 
8 00011 h 
9 11101 i 
10 01101 j 
11 10101 k 
12 00101 l 
13 11001 m 
14 01001 n 
15 10001 o 
16 00001 p 
17 11110 q 
18 01110 r 
19 10110 s 
20 00110 t 
21 11010 u 
22 01010 v 
23 10010 w 
24 00010 x 
25 11100 y 
26 01100 z 
27 10100 aa 
28 00100 bb 
29 11000 cc 
30 01000 dd 
31 10000 ee 
  
  
 
1
3
4
 
APPENDIX D 
 Prediction performance of MLR model  
 
 
Figure (e) Likelihood of various alternatives  
a b c e i q u y
alpha=0.05 0 0.272 0.270 0.013 0.090 0.339 0.005 0.011
alpha=0.50 0 0.222 0.315 0.022 0.096 0.343 0.000 0.002
alpha=0.65 0 0.038 0.481 0.002 0.076 0.403 0.000 0.000
alpha=0.75 0 0.008 0.690 0.000 0.058 0.244 0.000 0.000
alpha=0.85 0.0001 0.001 0.551 0.002 0.070 0.376 0.000 0.000
alpha=0.95 0.245 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.043 0.540 0.000 0.000
alpha=0.99 0.434 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.074 0.444 0.000 0.000
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
alpha=0.05 alpha=0.50 alpha=0.65 alpha=0.75 alpha=0.85 alpha=0.95 alpha=0.99
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